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ABSTRACT 
When the developing countries have relaxed their FDI regimes, the latent potential of 
FDI to spawn economic development remains in the type of governance that a particular 
country has adopted. It is not about the regime type (democracy or autocracy) but 
whether the type of governance has capabilities of improving human abilities.  The type 
of governance with requisite strategies to accelerate development beyond the rhetoric of 
the so called good governance is essential for building a strong developmental state.  
 
This study investigates the relationship between FDI and governance and its impact on 
economic development in Lesotho. Central to the debate, the study brings the importance 
of a role of the state in accelerating development. It compares both the market enhancing 
governance (good governance) and growth enhancing governance in order to distinguish 
a difference in the contribution that FDI makes towards economic development of 
Lesotho. It finally compares Lesotho with its peers in the sub-Saharan Africa which are at 
the same as Lesotho in relation to income size as classified by the World Bank. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Question 
Lesotho has remarkably done well during the past couple of years in relation to the 
attraction of foreign direct investment. It is one of the biggest textile exporters to the US 
market. As a result of that, it is one of the most successful countries in attracting FDI in 
the sub-Saharan African countries and its FDI inflow is mainly in textile and mining 
sectors. The reclassification of Lesotho as a lower middle income (from low middle 
income) in 2007 by the World Bank classification attests to the fact that Lesotho’s capital 
formation has significantly expanded. 
 
The swelling FDI spurt inflow into Lesotho has named Lesotho as a ‘beacon’ of hope and 
development in a continent all regularly branded unpromising1.However the declining 
human development index2 is not commensurate to the increasing levels of inward 
resources base. The initiatives that government took to unlock development so far do not 
seem to be of help for the Basotho people who are in unspeakable poverty. 
 
Good governance has been hoped to be a vehicle to economic development in the 
developing countries and Lesotho is one of the sub-Saharan African countries that have 
embraced the ethos of good governance. “Policy makers and academics agree that good 
governance matters for economic development”3. 
 
It is however evident that the situation in Lesotho is out of sync. Lesotho is still stagnant 
in its status as the least developed country and as still being described as one of the 
poorest countries by recent cross-sectional researches that have been undertaken in 
Lesotho. For instance Deborah Wason et al and Lesotho Household Survey indicated that 
                                                 
1
 Lesotho National Development (LNDC),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/images/Lesotho_supplement_finalforweb.pdf   
2
 UNDP, HDI Report 2007 
3
 Kauffman, World Bank Governance Indicators, A Decade of Measuring The Quality of Governance, 
2007, Washington DC 
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in 2003 56.6% of the total population of Lesotho (1.8 million) was still in sheer poverty 
and the Gini coefficient was hovering at 0.52 4. 
The study is intended to explore the interaction of FDI, governance and economic 
development in Lesotho. FDI has been endorsed both by international organizations such 
as IMF and World Bank and developed countries as an economic development catalyst. 
But it’s potential of closing resources’ gap and thus accelerating development in the host 
economy can fail. The study argues that FDI performance in Lesotho has a limited impact 
on acceleration of development because of the moderation effected on its potential by 
governance type and capabilities. The study put the two forms of governance: market 
enhancing governance (good governance) and growth enhancing governance and show 
the pitfalls of the exclusive market enhancing governance. It is assumed that FDI and 
governance type and capabilities act in concert to accelerate development. The study 
deems FDI as independent variable, governance type and capabilities as moderating 
variable and development as a dependent variable. 
 Rational of the study 
A preponderance of literature in a study of FDI, especially UNCTAD5, has warned that 
FDI has both costs and advantages for the recipient economy. The World Bank also has 
also indicated benefits of good governance on the hosting economy6. Therefore it is 
important to asses the interactive role of FDI inflow, governance on economic 
development in Lesotho. There is also a paucity of literature on issues linking FDI, 
governance and the economic development in Lesotho. Therefore, the study will assist in 
stimulating the debate regarding the captioned theme in Lesotho. 
 
As the objective of the study is to disentangle and explore the impact of FDI inflow on 
Lesotho’s economic development the study will enable the policy makers to have the 
empirical analysis of how FDI can be effective in changing the lives of the people for the 
better. The study will also inform both the policy makers and researchers existing debate 
of FDI, governance and economic development. 
                                                 
4
 Lesotho Household Budget Survey, November, 2006 Ministry of finance and Development Planning 
5UNCTAD 2003, foreign direct investment and performance requirements: new evidence 
from selected countries, UN New York, Geneva. 
6
 Ibid,p:1 
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Existing research on the question 
Other studies on the theme of FDI, governance and economic development calls for a 
necessity of review of the good governance that is internationally supported by both the 
World Bank and developed countries. The virtues of good governance had been highly 
extolled by the international organizations and numerous claims were made that it is one 
of the precondition for economic development take off7. The approach of these studies 
disputed the neo-liberal orthodoxy in relation to state intervention in the economic affairs 
and shed some doubts on appropriateness of good governance for acceleration of 
development in developing countries.  
 
 The theory of developmental state has been provoked of effects of the economic troubles 
that were a result of states’ failure to direct their development. It tries to strike a balance 
between neo-liberal stereotypes that view state intervention in economic affairs as 
unfavorable for economic development. Therefore, these prior studies fit well in this 
theoretical framework of developmental state. 
 
The developmental state thinking as propounded by some scholars such as Adrian 
Leftwich subscribes much to the view that, too much of the freedom of the market is 
inimical to the real development owing to the market limitations and also acknowledges 
the importance of the role of the state in expediting development8. Hence harnessing of 
the inward capital by the state for achieving economic development through the use of 
governance capabilities is kernel to the study. 
 
Limitations of the existing research  
The existing research had been able to make a recommendation of a necessity for a 
further review on the existing good governance but was not able to provide options for 
ideal governance that could be adopted to foster quick economic development in the 
developing countries making use of accumulating capital. The states in the sub-Saharan 
                                                 
7
 Constatina Kottaridi, FDI and the Role of Governance, Changing the Rules of the Game, Oxford Journals, 
vol.24, 79-98, UK.  2005,  
8
 Thandika Mkandawire, Thinking About Developmental States In Africa, Cambridge Political Economy 
Society, 2001. 
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countries are very weak because of the type of governance that the states have adopted. 
For the states to be fit enough to handle the refined interferences that are alignment with 
developmental state view, they should have strong political and directorial capabilities.9 
So, the existing research went wanting in this department because it was unable to realize 
that the developed countries were able to seize good governance only at their mature 
stage of development, and at the same time they keep prescribing good governance (that 
seems demanding and pressing in terms of resources) for the developing countries yet the 
they (developing countries) are only at infant stage of their economic development.  
 
Intended contribution 
The study is designed to assess the interaction of FDI, governance and development in 
the context of Lesotho. The use of developmental state theory assists in the realization of 
the interplay role therein of the three variables captioned and how the state is crucial in 
guiding development through equitable distribution of resources to the functioning 
sectors of the economy and the public. Unorthodoxy view on good governance is that, the 
exclusive good governance does not provide state with relevant capabilities necessary for 
expediting economic development; as such the study makes a comparison of both market 
enhancing and growth enhancing governance types. This comparison helps in explaining 
that, though it plausible that governance does matter for economic development (as has 
been touted by the World Bank), but the type and capabilities of governance matters most 
for efficiency in redistribution of the accumulated capital for faster development. This 
resonates with the modern mercantilism view on the aspect of building strong state 
capabilities necessary to speeding up economic development of the country. 
 
The developmental state theory advocates for a strong state which is only possible 
through the governance capabilities that are competent to promote development 
processes.  
The countries experiences show that, it is not the regime type per se (authoritarian or 
democracy regime) which is the key to successful economic transition and their interplay 
as well as interrelations between the state and private actors proved to be crucial … for 
economic transformation. This implies that the public goods, including institutions 
                                                 
9
 Mkhandawire T. Op Cit, p:297 
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crafted and enforced by the state as well as public policy are outcome of multiple 
actors10. 
 
This means that the government-led coordination in activities and programs that are 
aimed at activation of development in a country remains indispensable. The efficient 
implementation of public policy and high productivity all have their roots in the 
governance competences and appropriate approaches. Even if the capital accumulation 
can show unprecedented growth more than any other time; if the governance type and 
strategies are not matched with appropriate governance capabilities, fast economic 
development is hardly possible11. 
 
If the trends reveal that Lesotho has done better in attracting FDI than other countries in 
the sub-Saharan African countries, and in spite of FDI spurt evidence provides that 
Lesotho’s economic development is lacking behind in comparative terms the scenario 
will be attributable to governance type and its capabilities. If the governance type in 
Lesotho also divulges evidence that there are some inefficiencies in implementation of 
public policy and low levels of productivity resulting from inefficient distribution of 
resources, a general implication will be drawn that the governance type and capabilities 
are one of  the main culprits in  Lesotho’s case. 
 
Methodology 
The study uses a comparative analysis to confirm that Lesotho is doing better than other 
countries in the sub-Saharan African countries as number of researchers have contended. 
Concurrently, a comparison is made to assess Lesotho FDI performance in relation to 
GDP per capita with other countries in the sub-Saharan African countries. The main 
objective at this point is to assess efficiency in distribution of resources and whether FDI 
potential is translated into acceleration of economic development. 
 
                                                 
10
 Joachim Ahrens and Mengeringhause, Institutional Change and Economic Transition : Market enhancing 
governance, Chines Style, European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.3,no.1 pp 75-102 
11
 Ibid, p:78 
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For testing governance capabilities in relation to public policy implementation, the study 
used the data on bilateral commission for cooperation between Lesotho and South Africa. 
For a better inference, another comparative analysis was used between Lesotho and South 
Africa and South Africa Mozambique JPCC. This information was collated from the 
various official documents, in particular information related to Lesotho and South Africa 
JBCC. It also makes use of the electronic evidence provided by different sources such as 
international organizations and other scholars on issues of rethinking African 
development   
 
The World Bank Development Indicators data set for forty-three (43) sub-Saharan 
African countries was used for the two variables namely FDI and GDP per capita. Five of 
forty-eight countries were removed from the total list of these countries owing to the fact 
that other countries had some incomplete cases; this means that in some years there was 
some none available data (N/As). Those five countries include Eretria, Namibia, Mayotte, 
Sao Tome and Somalia. 
 
The expert opinion was also sought from various individuals in Lesotho and those 
include; the former chief executive of Standard Lesotho Bank and former Lecturer in 
department of economics in the National University of Lesotho and currently Lesotho 
Ambassador in Cairo. The lecturer in the department of economics in National University 
of Lesotho, the chief executive of Lesotho National Development Centre, Director in the 
ministry of development planning and Finance and some officials in the bureau of 
statistics in Lesotho. Other officials from the ministry of Trade, Marketing and Industry 
and Central Bank were contacted for crosschecking the reliability of data collected. Some 
information used was electronic materials, articles and news papers. 
 
The World Bank data used had to do with the independent variable (Foreign direct 
Investment, Dependent Variable, which is development that is measured by per capita 
GDP and human development index. However, data for human development index used 
is the UNDP data for 2007/2008 human development index. 
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Individuals interviewed for this study have asked for anonymity given the nature of their 
substantive work. The Mozambique and South Africa Joint Permanent Commission for 
Cooperation was downloaded from the South African government website. This data is 
presented by Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Foreign Affairs.  
 
 Data analysis 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) was recoded (gdp) and dubbed GDP per capita for the 
main name. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (as % of GDP) was also recoded (fdi) 
and named foreign direct investment for the main name. The data for each variable is 
covering fifteen years; from 1990 to 2005 and for each country, data has been averaged 
out. Refer to appendix 1 and 2. 
 
The spread sheet was used to computing of data and statistical software package namely 
“R” was used for data analysis. The graphs scatter plots and tables were produced using 
both the “R” commander and spread sheet respectively. For the HDI scatter plot  only 
those sub-Saharan countries that are at the same category of Lower middle Income as 
Lesotho were included for the purpose of comparison. Process tracing tool was used in 
relation to finding out capability in efficiency in implementation of public policy.  
 
The structure of the Report 
The first chapter sets up the stage in terms of looking at the historical perspectives of the 
FDI. It measures and reviews the main concepts. This chapter also, provides the attributes 
of the study and how the measures of concepts mirror those concepts. The second 
Chapter provides the theoretical framework and literature review. Theoretical framework 
facilitates a link to answering the research problem and justifying the approach as a 
possible avenue to the problem. It also explains the interrelationships amongst the 
concepts as captured in the research question. The literature review forms the second part 
of chapter two and entails prior related studies that are similarly or that are related to the 
explanation of the problem. This literature review provides a reflection of how other 
scholars view both the potential and weakness of FDI in various ways and at different 
levels. The third chapter presents the data analysis that begins with the univariate scatter 
                                                                               8 
plots for the FDI as percentage of GDP and GDP per capita over the period of fifteen 
years for Lesotho. The second stage of this analysis is the bivariate scatter plot of FDI 
inflow and GDP per capita for the forty three sub-Saharan African countries. This is 
where the main comparison for evidence is being made. The explanation of trends and 
scatter plots for both graphs is made at this level.  
 
The fourth chapter involves presentation of the bilateral commissions Joint Bilateral 
Commission for Cooperation between Lesotho and South Africa (JBCC) and Joint 
Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JPCC) between South Africa and Mozambique. 
This chapter makes a comparison of the two commissions that is aimed at testing Lesotho 
governance capabilities in effective implementation of public policy. This chapter will 
explain why the situation is out of sync in Lesotho in relation to the hypothesis that 
stipulated that governance type and capabilities limit FDI potential in accelerating 
economic development in Lesotho.  The Chapter five discusses the main observations 
made in the analysis both in chapter three and four. Finally, conclusion forms part of this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction  
Background to the Study 
The foreign capital flow out of the developed countries to the developing countries in 
three forms; grants investments, debts. Grants are a form of capital that involves bilateral 
agreements between two countries and they are widely known as foreign aid or ODA.  
An investment consists of port-folio equity investment. The goal of equity share 
possession connotes that port-folio equity investment is more of view of financial returns 
not managerial authority. The second category of investment is for FDI which its equity 
share is motivated by lasting managerial power12.  FDI therefore turns to be the main 
interest of the paper and will form central part of the discussion. 
 
According to David Yoffie, the advancement of FDI took three waves. Firstly FDI 
emerged in 1960s to early 70s. This wave was driven by locational advantage (low labor 
costs) and was basically Greenfield FDI. The second wave emerged in the late 1970s and 
by this time it was able to graduate beyond Greenfield FDI to M&A and at this stage was 
manufacturing oriented FDI. The third wave came in the 1990s to date and it was mainly 
characterized by a myriad of functions. This FDI is in Greenfield fronted fabrication 
facilities. All these three waves were driven by political change both in Japan and US13.  
 
Following the neo-liberals that were jostling in favor of opening up of economies for 
capital flow and professing that FDI was crucial for growth, African countries also tried 
to change their perception in relation to FDI. Most of the African leaders used to have 
apprehensions that FDI was a threat to their countries’ sovereignty. However, this school 
of thought in tandem with numerous World Bank reports cautioned that retarded 
economic growth in Africa was owing to poor capital accumulation;  WTO, IMF and the 
UN organizations and some developed countries such as Japan, USA and European 
community had also been for years drumming up for general spread of FDI through the 
                                                 
12
 Ha Joon Chang , 2007, Bad Samaritans, The guilty secrets of Rich Nations and Threat To Global 
Prosperity, Random House Business Books, UK. 
13
 David B. Yoffie. Foreign Direct Investment, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6538.pdf, accessed on this 
date: 13/08/08 
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multilateral and transnational companies14. As a result, estimates15 show that equity 
investment of both portfolio and direct investment in the emerging economies in 2002 
increased.  The IMF estimated that in 2002 there was an inflow of $ 156.3 billion in 2002 
to the developing countries, compared to $149.4 billion of 2001. As such, African 
countries have endorsed FDI as an animator of growth. 
 
 It is in this view that, Lesotho being a tiny, mountainous and resource underprivileged 
country within South Africa has emerged as the largest and fastest growing exporter of 
textile from Africa to the US. Its swift industrializing enlargement has been motivated by 
inflows of export-based FDI and lately has natural resource-seeking FDI16.  At this rate, 
Lesotho is said to have performed relatively well in attracting FDI inflows in Africa 
coming from a deep-range of $3 million in 1982 to $27 million in 2002 and $52 million 
in 2005.17 
This FDI surge into Lesotho was stimulated by trade privileges offered by the US such as 
MFA and AGOA, respectively. Lesotho’s currency, the Maloti, which is pegged to South 
African Rand, the low inflation rate which constantly ranged between 10-15 percent 
annually since the year 2000 to date, its free trade agreement with its neighbors in 
Southern Africa, SACU that offers access to free large market. However there are few 
exports of textiles to the region. More than 90% of Lesotho’s exports are destined to the 
US market.  The democratic government which also seemed stable for years after the 
1998 political turmoil had highly appealed for investment.  
 
                                                 
14
 MIGA, http://www.miga.org/news/index_sv.cfm?stid=1506&aid=297, accessed on this date:13/08/08 
15
 OECD Report 2002, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VGK-487KG3C-
3&_user=1378557&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_use
rid=1378557&md5=9ff080b9c799337991f23a89ca94adbd, accessed on this date: 13/08/08 
16
 Sanjaya Lall, FDI, AGOA And Manufactured Exports From A Land-Locked, Least- 
Developed African Economy: Lesotho, October 2003 
17
 World Investment Report 2006, FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for 
Development, UN. New York. 
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Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 
MFA was ratified in 1974 and had been the basic turning point for GATT to ensure 
fundamental set of laws and ethics of non-discrimination in the international trade18 and 
was enforced until the coming of the agreement textile clothing (ATC) under the auspices 
of WTO in 199519.  The developed countries had to solicit the imposition of quotas on the 
then squirt of imports from the developing countries in an attempt to deal with the threat 
that seemed possible on their local industries. The restraints were in particular focusing 
on those goods from Asia countries; for instance China20. However, MFA expired in 
December 2004 and implications of its phasing out had an impact on some of the 
developing countries such as Lesotho. 
 
However, in the period 1995 to 2004, the ATC became an interfacing tool and was a 
recipe of many ingredients: manufactured goods coverage, including fabric products, plan 
for continuing incorporation of these fabric products into general agreement on tarrifs and 
trade (GATT) 1994 rules, liberalization process to advancing expansion of quotas to their 
elimination, protective mechanisms in favor of local firms of developed countries during 
the period of changeover and inclusion of rules of origin21. 
 
Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
AGOA came into force in 2000 as a result of American comprehensive arrangement of 
trade preferences and other intentions22. The main purpose was to improve the US market 
relative and exclusive openness to the 39 sub-Saharan African countries. At first, it was 
valid until 2008; however it was modified in 2004 to expire in 201523. The major 
amendments in AGOA   regulation for expanding the fabric proviso to 2012 and in July 
                                                 
18
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm, accessed on this date: 28/June/2008 
19
 Esther de Haan and Myriam Vander Stichele, Investing In The Garment Industry In Africa, Footloose 
Investors, August 2007, Amsterdam 
20
 Ibid,p:15 
21
 Junyuan Christopher Tan, Liberalization of Trade in Textile and Clothing, China Impact on ASEAN 
Economies, May 2005,USA 
22
 Federal Register, April 2008, USA. 
23
 http://www.agoa.info/, accessed on this date: 28/June/2008 
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2007 another improvement on textile certificate of origin was put into place and approved 
entry of 6400 products including clothing from sub-Saharan Africa24. 
 
 
  
Despite the fact that AGOA endows recipient African countries with free access to the 
US market and facilitates for high level dialogue on trade and investment in form of US-
sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum, certain terms and conditions apply for 
making a country eligible each year by the discretion of the United States of America25. 
Such conditions include encouragement of trade liberalization between US and Africa. 
Safeguarding of intellectual property rights and upgrading in standard testing; 
classification and qualifications, ensuring the global renowned labor rights, to the 
inclusion of rights to negotiate jointly and inhibition of coerced labor, removal of price 
controls, subventions, and interference with the business authorizing procedures; 
supporting private ownership of public owned businesses;  the abolition of government 
corruption; Non-involvement in actions which sabotage the  United States general 
security or foreign policy interests and  implementation of a market-focused economy26. 
 
Lesotho Challenges as a sub-Saharan African Top exporter of 
apparel to the US  
 Lesotho experienced a setback blow when the MFA expired in December 2004. Some 
factories closed down and as a result thousands of Basotho people lost their jobs from the 
textile industries. The FDI growth was destabilized in 2005 to 2006 by Chinese market 
rivalry after the elimination of MFA restrictions and this competitiveness resulted in 17 
percent fall of Lesotho’s exports in 2005. Lesotho also got disadvantaged at times by the 
appreciation of Rand on which Loti is pegged. China’s admission to world trade 
                                                 
24
 http://www.agoa.info/, accessed on this date: 28/June/2008 
 
25
 Gabriel Laizer, AfricanTextiles, TED Case Studies Number 633, 2001, 
http://www.american.edu/TED/africatextile.htm, accessed on this:29/June/2008 
26
 http://www.cetim.ch/en/interventions_details.php?iid=156, accessed on this date:29/June/2008 
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organization (WTO) and the negotiation influence it exercises in taking away the trade 
favored treatment for exports from least developed countries overshadowed whichever 
optimism of prospective budgetary assistance to Lesotho government27. 
The model for industrialization in Lesotho is not sustainable. It is a footloose M&A that 
relies on one major source of FDI (mainly from China). It relies on one major export 
(apparel and textile) and one major export destination (US). Moreover these exports are 
driven by AGOA which can end at any time. The end of MFA is case in point that 
brought uncertainty in Lesotho’s textile industry. 
All over again, the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis in the US, which is spiraling and likely 
to cause a recession in the US economy will soon or latter affect Lesotho. The sub-prime 
mortgage loan is the problem in the housing market that has resulted in a problem in the 
financial market in USA. How did this happen? In brief terms, this phenomenon has got 
its roots in the investors’ willingness to provide mortgage loans to customers with poor 
credit record and eventually with the increasing interest rates the customers defaulted28.  
Subsequently, the Banks in the US confiscated property from defaulters and that has 
trapped Americans in a revolting debt.  This has affected the consumption patterns of 
consumers and Wal-Mart has recently reported a decline in consumers purchasing trend. 
These vindicate Charlene Clayton’s argument that “Should the property market in the 
United States go belly-up, American consumers will dramatically curtail their spending 
and this will affect economies around the world, including South Africa.”29  In the 
beginning of 2008 we saw Tito Mboweni (Governor of South African Reserve Bank) on 
media reporting that investors were pulling out of South African economy. “Figures 
released this week show that… This year to date foreigners have been net sellers of South 
                                                 
27
 Raphael Kaplinsky , The Impact of Asian Drivers On The Developing World, August, 2006, Open 
University, Milton 
28
 www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/beat_the_press_Archive?month=02&yaer=2008, accessed on  this 
date:29/June/2008 
29
 Charlene Clayton, South Africa will  Suffer, If US Bubbles Burst, Personal Finance, 18 June 2005, 
http://http.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSetId=300&fSectionId=709&fArticleId=2562104, accessed on this 
date: 13/08/08 
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African equities…”30. This is because investors believe that US economy is the last one 
in the world to collapse, so they are fleeing to safer economy.  As a result, organization 
for economic cooperation and development (OECD) economic outlook has reported that 
Chinese economic growth is beginning to show signs of slowing- down due to a lower 
export contribution31. This is because China is also one of the biggest exporters to US 
from Asia. 
The curtailed spending of consumers in US affects such countries like China, and 
Lesotho is likely to experience a serious downturn in its exports and FDI as US 
consumers continue to hoard money. The consumers’ confidence to spend is wearing 
with spiraling sub-prime mortgage crisis that is taking its toll against US economic 
performance32. 
Lesotho Economic Structure 
This section discusses structural outlook of Lesotho’s economy. First of all, it briefly 
discusses Lesotho’s economic freedom, its performance in comparison with the world 
standards and the degree to which Lesotho economy is rated by World Heritage 
Foundation. It further presents the performance of the three interlocking economic sectors 
that are being explained in figure1.0.  The primary sector is comprised of agriculture and 
mining sector, the secondary sector entails manufacturing, electricity, telecommunication 
and water services and tertiary sector also show economic performance of business 
activity.  
 
Lesotho’s macroeconomic policy is hemmed in due to its membership in the Common 
Monetary Area (CMA).  According to Heritage Foundation 2008 report33, Lesotho’s 
economy is 51% free and this positions Lesotho at 132nd freest economy in the world and 
                                                 
30
 Maya Fisher-French, South Africa’s financial services industry might be relatively unscathed by turmoil, 
but the flight of invstors could bring a balance of payments crunch, Mail and Guardian, March 20-27, 2008, 
SA. 
31
 www.propeller.com/China, accessed on this date:28/June/2008. 
32
 Donald W.Dony, Is the Fed Too Late to Head Off  a US Recession? 
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article2977.html, accessed on this date: 14/08/08 
33
  Heritage Foundation Report of 2008, Index of Economic Freedom-Lesotho, 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Lesotho, accessed on this date: 07/07/2008  
08 The Heritage Foundation 200 2008 The Heritage Foundation 8 The Heritage Foundation 
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31st out of 48 sub-Saharan African countries. Though the Government of Lesotho 
intervenes in price make-up (markets) of certain commodities, it does not strongly grade 
itself in any category but is equivalent to world standard of monetary freedom. The 
Business freedoms, i.e. to open, operate and closing business is rated at 56.9%. This 
means that the regulatory regimes in Lesotho are still tight and its trade foreign policy 
also has some degree of restrictiveness because of its membership in SACU. Opening a 
business costs an average of 73 days, as opposed to the world average of 43 days. 
Attaining a business license takes more than the world average of 234 days, and costs are 
high for setting up business. Trade liberty is also rated at 56.4% i.e. the weighted 
aggregate tariff rate was 16.8% in 2005 and the paucity of candid and diaphanous 
procedures in enacting import licensing, import bans and restrictions and corruption are 
detrimental to trade34. The fiscal freedom is at 67.2%; the tax regime is onerous with the 
income tax rate of 35%. Corporate tax rate for all companies with the exception of the 
manufacturing sector that resides in the range of 25% is quite steep for both employees 
and business at large35. The value added tax (VAT) is another burden on the shoulders of 
the entire business market while the grinding tax on dividends is quite backbreaking. 
Freedom from political interruption is ranked at 46%; the government spending is at 
42.1% of the total GDP. The privatization is going at a slow pace however it is at better 
rate in comparison with other countries in the region. The monetary freedom is at 75.4%; 
the inflation hovers at 5.3% hence unstable prices of commodities. The investment 
freedom is also rating at 30%; the political turmoil and paucity of transparency costs the 
FDI inflow a big deal. The financial freedom is at 50% and is very much weak however 
pegged to South African through the common monetary area (CMA) that includes 
Swaziland and Namibia. A bigger proportion of people do not have sufficient entrée to 
banking service and financial controls barely contest for improvement.36 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Lesotho, accessed on this date: 07/07/2008 
35
 http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Lesotho, accessed on this date: 07/07/2008 
36
  Heritage Foundation Report of 2008, Ibid 
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Figure1.0 
Economic Structure
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Primary Sector 
Figure 1.037, illustrates that Lesotho experienced the worst drought in the period under 
review. The average yield per hectare of maize production is estimated to have declined 
by 42.0 percent while sorghum declined by 25.0.The shortfall was expected to be 
counterbalanced by imports to the tune of 256 000 tonnes during the marketing year 
2007/08. The sectors share to GDP is 20.0 percent. The mining and quarrying has 
displayed an exceptionally good performance of late, rising by 150 percent in 2004 
following a 5.7 percent increase of the preceding year. This is attributable to the 
reopening of Letseng diamond mine which has boosted the sector immensely. It helps to 
elevate its potential as a diversification channel away from traditional export-led growth 
through manufacturing38. Table 1.0, shows a significant increase in diamond production.  
 
 
  
                                                 
37
 2006 database from Lesotho Bureau of Statistics on Lesotho economic structure was used to construct 
the bar chart as seen at  fig 1.0 
38
 Lesotho review 2006, http://www.sanec.org/images/stories/Country/Lesotho_Review_2006.pdf, accessed 
on this date: 13/08/08 
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Table 1.0, the trend of mining sector in Lesotho 
Total Value(Maloti) Year  Total weight of carats 
(Maloti) 
  
Total export levy 
(Maloti) 
1995 13,190.61 3,457,788.98 518,668.35 
1996 3,128.50 475,639.87 71,345.98 
1997 4,204.92 572,126.00 85,818.90 
1998 2,177.39 369,544.00 55,431.60 
1999 2,052.57 582,870.00 87,430.50 
2000 1,163.79 771,691.00 115,753.63 
2001 553.59 498,896.00 74,834.40 
2002 314.34 4,704,000.00 70,500.00 
2003 1,898.94 38,270,911.96 2,696,167.84 
2004 682.94 173,500,143.20 12,167,730.03 
2005 50,355.78 431,107,018.02 30,228,701.70 
2006 97,097.69.00 599,209,112.90 44,516,288.00 
Source: Department of mining and Geology39 
Secondary sector trend 
In Lesotho, the secondary sector comprises manufacturing, electricity and water, building 
and construction sub sectors. The consumption of electricity has increased 15.5 percent 
on quarterly basis, and by 0.3 percent on annual basis, while total water consumption 
increased by 69.9 percent on a seasonally adjusted quarter to quarter basis and a 
meaningful fluctuation of building permits for both commercial and residential also 
enabled an improvement in this sector. On average, this trend, as seen on figure 1.0, 
facilitate a change for better to the secondary sector since 1995.  
 
Tertiary sector trend 
The value of retail sales turnover, as an indicator of economic performance of business 
activity in the economy and investment expenditure increased by 20.4 and 18.8 
respectively as the tertiary trend affirms on figure 1.0. The increase on annual basis 
indicates long term capital formation, while on shorter term the economy is expected to 
have accumulated more fixed capital. The tertiary sector remains the main contributor to 
the GDP, at the share of 44.8 percent.  Since 2001, the economy has been heavily reliant 
on the exponential growth of exports in clothing sector as a result of the introduction of 
AGOA. This scenario exposes Lesotho’s economy to the danger of external shocks. 
                                                 
39
 The data was provided by the ministry of natural resources, Department of mining and Geology officers. 
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Lesotho public governance outlook 
Lesotho as one of the least developed countries has adopted good governance as 
propounded and measured by World Bank which has been discussed in full details later- 
on in this study. According World Bank governance indicators, Lesotho governance 
indices rank in the following  percentages; voice and accountability 52.4, political 
stability 44.7 governance effectiveness 26.8, regulatory quality 24.8, rule of law 47.1 and 
control of corruption 54.640. The grading is good when it is close to 100% and bad when 
it is close to 0%. 
 
This governance model continues to be crippled by awful crony capitalism in Lesotho. 
Crony capitalism denotes that there is a thin line between the economic oligarchs and 
political elites41. It develops over time through number of ways which will just be 
mentioned because of space limitation and purpose of the study42. (i) The political 
appointments and lucrative employment in favor of individuals who managed to 
ingratiate themselves with government executives, (ii) Paucity of fiscal restraints and 
state financing of distinctive affinities, (iii) misguidance of parliament and the populace 
(iv) The dispensation of eminent privileged positions and power to the cronies of the 
government executives and lastly the forsaking of competition policy and adoption of 
segregating policies in favor of certain industries43. 
 
Crony capitalism as a spill over of crony statism into business sector is not in alignment 
with the ethos of developmental theory as the government acts as a pander to certain few 
groups of individuals and as a result, maintains the gap between the rich and poor 
yawning. 
                                                 
40
 Meisel Nicolas: 2004,Governance, Culture and Development, A Different Perspective On Corporate 
Governance, OECD, USA 
41
 Mark Latham, Competitive Capitalism versus Crony Capitalism between Labour and Liberal,08 19,03 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/19/1061261153599.html, accessed on this date:07th /08/08 
42http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/19/1061261153599.html, accessed on this date, 7th/08/2008  
43
 http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/19/1061261153599.html, accessed on this date, 7th/08/2008 
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 Measurement of concepts 
 Foreign Direct Investment  
The OECD Benchmark neoclassical definition44 describes FDI as a type of cross border 
investment  capital set up by a citizen investor in another economy  with the purpose and 
intent of getting hold of  durable and strategic management significance in an enterprise 
undertaking investment in a foreign  economy other than that of the direct investor. The 
impetus of the direct investor is a deliberate, lasting   symbiotic association with the 
enterprise (direct investment) to cement a certain extent of authority and control in the 
management of the direct investment venture. The durable association is secured and 
effected by at least 10% of the decision making process. The direct investor intents and 
purposes are different from the portfolio investment where investors are not necessarily 
interested in control and authority in the normal operations of the company itself.  
UNCTAD 2003 however defines FDI as the subset of capital flow which include only the 
financing of a foreign affiliate by a parent company in form of loans, equity capital or 
reinvested earnings45. This implies that, a parent company owns or controls certain assets 
of a foreign affiliate.  
 
Phrases like lasting interests, control and foreign affiliate seem to be common in all 
definitions provided. The phrase lasting interest is used basically because FDI is 
associated with ‘sunk–costs’46. FDI does not just disappear tomorrow because the 
situation is bad in a certain country. It stays even if situation is not conducive because of 
huge capital that committed in a certain country’s economy. This part of definition 
distinguishes FDI from other forms of international flow of money such portfolio 
investment and institutional investment. ‘Ownership and control’ words have got a 
connotation of commitment and share of leverage that FDI suppose to have to a host 
country and foreign affiliate company respectively.  
                                                 
44
 www.oecd.org/def/investment/statistics, accessed on this date:07/06/2008 
45
 UNCTD 2003, foreign direct investment and performance requirements: new evidence from selected countries, UN 
New York, Geneva 
46
 Sunk-costs are those costs that an investor has incurred to set up an enterprise including all the capital 
that has been committed for the enterprise to start up. The greater the sunk costs for a direct investor, the 
more likely to invest more in the same economy. 
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Lesotho definition of FDI 
Lesotho defines FDI as, “Non-residents branches and subsidiaries of enterprise or its 
subsidiaries. Non-resident enterprises in which, the enterprise or its subsidiaries have 
equity of 10 percent “47. By this definition, it is understandable that Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project royalties do not qualify to be classified as FDI. “Both are inward flows 
however FDI is a special subset of capital flow which include only financing of foreign 
affiliate by a parent company in form of loans, equity capital or re-invested earnings”.48 
 The main features of FDI 
As it has been laid down that it is always notable to identify FDI pertinence within the 
total accounts of a country concerned and within the purview of balance of payments and 
international investment rating structure49. 
 
o The national financial accounts and flows of funds (in system of national 
accounts) makes record of the total stocks of funds and matches flows between 
the economic units which form part of business dealings with citizen economic 
units or have economic networks with them. FDI is only in the class of cross-
border financing business ventures. 
o FDI is one of the five practical types of the financial accounts of balance of 
payments and commensurate to international investment arrangement statements. 
The data for balance of payments and international investment set-ups are 
expressed as broad aggregates for the major sub-components of these accounts. 
o “Conceptually, the population of enterprises by the statistics of activities of the 
multinational enterprises is subcategory of enterprises covered by FDI.  
 
Types of FDI 
There are two basic forms of FDI by target; the Greenfield and Mergers and Acquisition. 
Though the two relatively are deemed having potential for growth, their impact might be 
                                                 
47
 Central Bank of Lesotho, Report On The Private Capital Flows Surveys, 2006 Maseru 
48
 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review, 2004 Lesotho. 
49
 OECD Investment Report 2008, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/28/40887916.pdf, accessed on 
this date:13/08/08 
                                                                               21 
comparatively be not the same on the economy of the host. As could be their impact, their 
motivation is also not the same. 
 Greenfield Investment is defined as a form of FDI that conveys with it, the new 
production facilities into the host economy.50  
  M&A is also defined as the form of FDI that acquires the existing assets within 
the host economy and is common in developing and emerging economies. 
However policy makers and some scholars such as Adams have indicated 
lingering concerns pertaining to the commitment of this form of FDI to the host 
economy since it transfers ownership of production facilities to the foreign 
companies51. 
 How M&A and Greenfield Investments differ  
In its report of 2000, UNCTAD has warned that the benefits of M&A are less with and 
sometimes the risk of negative upshots is high compared to Greenfield potential52. The 
following downside aspects of M&A were identified: 
 As the form of financial resource, M&A is characterized with inability to 
augment the capital stocks in the host. It has smaller investment benefits to 
the host economy compared to Greenfield FDI. 
 FDI that goes through M&A framework is less likely to bring hope in so far 
as better technologies are concerned than Greenfield. 
 M&A FDI does no have potential of job creation for the local staff at the 
early stage of its entry into the host and can lead to some provisional layoffs 
for the duration of restructuring the enterprise. 
 When the bottom line objective is to have a mutual benefiting set up between 
the host and direct investor, M&A FDI has a propensity to benefit a direct 
investor at the expense of local companies. 
                                                 
50
 Mtwala Mwilima, Foreign Direct Investment, Africa Research Network. 
www.larri.com.na/research/FDI%20in%20Africa.doc, accessed on this date:12/06/08 
51
 Charles Adams and YU Ching Wong, Trends In Global and Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Laos and 
Vietnam, August 2002, Asia. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/fdi/eng/pdf/wong.pdf, 
Accessed on this date: 12/06/08 
52
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2000_en.pdf, accessed on 
this date: 13/08/08 
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 Development 
To take into account multi-dimensionality of the concept, gross domestic product (GDP) 
and human development index (HDI) will be adopted as measures of economic 
development in this paper. 
    GDP as defined and explained by UNDP is an average gauge of overall national 
economic performance for a given period of time. It represents the market value 
of the total goods and services produced in a country53. It does not however 
account for the quality of life, income inequalities amongst the citizens, level of 
quality of education, the environmental quality control and the extent to which 
political rights allotted to the people. 
 
    HDI, as defined by UNDP, is understood as a compendium of numerous 
development indicators that measure an aggregate of reforms and progress in a 
country54. The development aspects that HDI take into consideration include: 
Long and healthy life as measured by life expectancy at birth,  Knowledge, that is 
measured by adult literacy rates, and compounded primary, secondary and tertiary 
gross enrolment ratio and decent standard of living as measured by  GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in requisites of US dollars.55 
 Governance 
World Bank, using Daniel Kaufman’s benchmark, defines governance “as the set of 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” 56. It further 
adopted six indicators to measure governance: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption. In a brief account, let us have a summary of 
what all these indicators of good governance measure: 
 
                                                 
53
 UNDP, International Conference ,19 to 20 November 2007, Brussels 
54
 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007-2008, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/, 
accessed on this date: 08/06/08 
55
 The HDI as a composite measure of economic progress has been adopted as UNDP prescribe it in 2007-
2008 report. 
56
 World Bank, a Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance, World Wide Governance Indicators, 
1996-2006, Washington. 
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The degree to which populace in a country is free to participate in a  process of 
electing its government, at the same time freedom of speech, association and a 
freedom of media are also considered. They cover conceptions of the probability of 
interruption of the smooth functioning of government through illegal means. Again 
they also relate to the extent, to which the public institutions are efficient, free from 
political manipulations, excellence in policy choice and integrity of government’s 
dedication to the execution of such policies. 
 
Furthermore, they measure how far government is capable of facilitating a favorable 
environment for the private sector and the extent to which government adopts and 
controls its own policies. The scope of these indicators covers the loyalty to the rule 
of law, levels of criminality and hostility, ensuring of observance of formal 
agreements and whether certain factions of the society practices do not conform to the 
rule of law. Finally, they rate the capacity of powers that be for using authority vested 
in them without misappropriation to personal benefit. 
 
However Mushtaq H. Khan makes a distinction between market enhancing and 
growth enhancing governance57. Neither of the two is likely to discount the role of 
governance in economic development but the difference resides in the organization of 
state capacities and stages of development at which each type of governance can be 
adopted. The former is synonymous to the good governance as measured by 
Kaufman58, and the latter is defined as: form of governance that obliges significant 
capabilities of state to expedite amassment, equally in private and public spheres of 
state, and ensure efficiency in production and development in the captioned sectors59.  
The indicators of good governance or market enhancing governance require heavy 
financing for them to be effectively achieved. So, the developing countries over stress 
their insufficient resources in an effort to making ends meet (in relation to achieving 
                                                 
57
 Mushtaq H. Khan, Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, August 2007, UK. 
58
 Ibid, p: 2 
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good governance) when concurrently compromising the real growth and development 
for their people.60 
 
As a result, the developing countries (especially sub-Saharan countries) seem to be 
grappling with good governance model. It has to note that most countries African 
countries relinquished growth enhancing governance, at least a decade before Daniel 
Kaufman could coin good governance indicators. It means the model is now above ¼ 
of the century but the sub-Saharan countries are still struggling to achieve better score 
for each indicator in relation to World Bank benchmarks. The table below clearly 
shows how the sub-Saharan region is performing in relation to good governance. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.0  Sub-Saharan region and Good Governance scores 
Indicator                                                                                     score 
Voice and Accountability                                                            33.2 
Governance effectiveness                                                          26.8 
Political Stability                                                                         -34.2 
Regulatory quality                                                                       27.8 
Rule of law                                                                                    47.1 
Control of corruption                                                                  54.6 
Source: World Bank Governance indicators61 
Despite the G8 pledged support on good governance as enshrined in APRM, the regional 
good governance indices reveal how slow the region is progressing in relation to effective 
embracing of good governance model.   
 
                                                 
60
 Ibid, p:4 
 
 
 
 
61
 World Bank , Worldwide Governance indicators, 1996 to 2007, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, accessed on this date: 27/05/08 
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Each of these goals, such as the reduction of corruption, the achievement of stable 
property rights, and effective rule of law requires significant expenditures of public 
resources. Poor economies do not have the required fiscal resources and requiring them to 
achieve these goals before economic development takes off faces a serious problem of 
sequencing. 62 
 
The main point of this argument is not to condemn the market enhancing governance but 
is to give emphasis to the significance of sequencing.63  As some arguments have 
emphasized the substance of achieving economic development before embracing of good 
governance goals, the early stages of development require great care of state where 
growth enhancing governance can turn around development outlook in developing 
countries. The resources redistribution which is essential at the early stage of 
development seems not likely through market mechanism alone and constantly market 
itself is riddled with numerous letdowns especially when it comes to reversals of low 
productivity64. 
 
 The argument on sequencing issue is consistent with Ha Joon Chang argument that 
“virtually all NDCs actively used interventionist industrial, trade and technology (ITT) 
policies that are aimed at promoting infant industries during their catch up periods” 65. 
This means that, before the now developed countries (NDCs) could adopt the market 
enhancing policies, first they adopted the growth enhancing all with the view of keeping 
pace first with successful developers. Joseph Stiglitz agrees that, “Many of the 
sequencing mistakes reflected fundamental misunderstandings of both economic and 
political processes, misunderstandings that were particularly associated with those who 
believed in market fundamentalism” 66. This implicitly means that the exclusive adoption 
of market enhancing governance will not help the state to achieve the cohesiveness of the 
society as developmental state view envisages. 
                                                 
62
 Khan M. Op. Cit, p:4 
63
 Ibid,p:3 
64
 Ibid,p:3 
65
 Ha Joon Chang: 2003, Kicking Away The Ladder, Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, 
British Library, UK. 
66
 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its discotents, 2002, The Penguin Press, UK. 
                                                                               26 
 Distinction between market enhancing and growth enhancing governance 
Marketing enhancing governance puts emphasis on state-minimized intervention with the 
market. The goals of market enhancing were earlier discussed in good governance of 
World Bank approach. Yet, the main assumption is that market will be more effective on 
its own.67 
 
The growth enhancing governance involves the function of governance in facilitating 
catching up process by developing countries in the perspective of complementing the 
market infallibilities. It concentrates on efficaciousness of state agencies for expediting   
transfer of resources to more industrious and prolific sectors and even stepping up the 
adoption and acquiring new skills of advanced effective technology68. The primary 
objectives include attaining market and non-market allocation of resources to more 
industrious and efficacious sectors, administering inducements and obligations for 
acquiring quick technology and productivity improvement and upholding of the political 
stability in the background of swift social reform. 69 
Investment share in GDP growth in the sub-Saharan African Countries 
In comparison with some selected countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, Lesotho growth 
seems to be propelled by factor accumulation70. In the period 1960 to 2002, real growth 
rate per year was at 3.4 and the factor accumulation was pacing at 3.5% comprising 105 
percent of GDP; where 74% was contributed by physical capital and 31% was share of 
labor capital71. The table 2.0 below summarizes the investment as a percentage of GDP 
for the period stipulated in the notes of the table. 
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 Loc cit, p:3 
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 Khan M. Op. Cit. p:18 
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Table 3.0, Real GDP growth in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2002 
 
Country Investment/GDP Real GDP growth Total productivity 
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.9 3.2 0 
Angola 18.9 2.3 -1.4 
Botswana 27.5 7.5 2 
Lesotho 44.2 3.4 -0.1 
Madagascar 13.1 1.2 -0.2 
Malawi 14.6 5.3 0 
Mozambique 20.4 3.6 0.3 
Namibia 20.5 1.9 -1.1 
South Africa 18.9 3.1 0.1 
Swaziland 22.4 4.6 1.4 
Mauritius 23.9 5.3 1.2 
Zambia 14.3 2.3 1.4 
Zimbabwe 16.8 2.6 -0.7 
Source (Source: Tahari, Ghura, Akitoby and Aka, 2004 and World Development Indicators in IMF Country report ) 
Notes:” Investment is average gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP from1980-2004”72. 
 
Though investment seems important, (at least for each country selected) there are 
variations in importance. For Lesotho, the share of investment in GDP is relatively large 
however the real GDP growth does not surpass that of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Swaziland. This scenario confirms how investment, as another form of capital 
formation, is important and indispensable for Lesotho’s economic development.  
 
The export led FDI into Lesotho, contribute more or less 90% of the total investment. 
The country has provided evidence that it is the African biggest exporter of clothing to 
the US market. It is one of the few countries to be successful in FDI in the non-mining 
sector and given its size in terms of population and economy, its FDI is relatively too 
outsized.73 
 
Regarding the total productivity, Khan’s argument seems to be supported with the 
empirical evidence here. First, it was argued that the good governance model is incapable 
ensuring effective allocation of resources due to its infallibilities.  Secondly, the 
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productivity is contingent on effective resource dispensation. So, the IMF demonstrated 
levels of productivity in sub-Saharan Africa of which Lesotho is one of the lowest. 
Swaziland level of productivity speaks volumes about the focus of governance capacities. 
We recall that Swaziland being one of the tiny Southern African countries, a little bit 
smaller than Lesotho and with its investment comprising only 22.4% in the total GDP.  
Mostly, it calls for an investigation whether good governance, as most of the sub-Saharan 
African countries have adopted it, is consistent with high productivity. The evidence is 
not convincing that supporting good governance will correspond with high productivity.74 
 
 What makes FDI important and urgent for Lesotho? 
The factors that justify this conceptual framework are both economic and political: As a 
landlocked country, Lesotho has suffered legitimacy shrinkage and some scholars keep 
referring to it as ‘governments of dubious legitimacy’ due to its inability to creating and 
sustaining employment for its citizens since its independence75. Its reliance and 
dependence on migrant labor for more than a decade made its legitimacy doubtful to 
some Basotho people both inside and outside Lesotho76. “Lesotho’s self-doubts were 
reflected in two conferences sponsored by the National University of Lesotho focusing on 
Lesotho’s role in a post-apartheid South Africa…National Union Mineworkers endorsing 
the political integration into democratic South Africa.” 77.  Though by this time, it was 
already commanding a preferential access to European market through Lome` convention 
III, only a few South African and Taiwan companies were slowly trickling down to 
Lesotho. This means that the unemployment rate was still very high in Lesotho and this is 
what made Lemon to comment South Africa for being a conceived neighborhood that 
afforded Basotho people with time and space rights for earning their livelihoods in the 
same manner it did to the Afrikaners and Zulus.78 
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Lesotho government legitimacy was even more dented when Basotho mineworkers were 
homologated and included within legal framework and national boundaries of the new 
South Africa. This privilege was provided to those migrant workers who had a minimum 
period of 10 years working in South Africa79. As Lesotho’s constitution does not sanction 
the dual citizenship and approval of citizenship, the Basotho mineworkers forfeited their 
Lesotho citizenship automatically and   put some constraints on Lesotho’s economy since 
contraction in flow of remittances into Lesotho was inevitable. “The Basotho nation is no 
more ‘natural’ than any other. It possesses a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, but the 
‘nation in an ethnic sense is already divided between two states, Lesotho and South 
Africa.” 80  As if it was not enough, the problem got aggravated when retrenchment took 
a toll against Basotho mineworkers around the same time (1995-1996).  “Alternative 
employment opportunities for retrenched workers are severely limited.” (Roy Love81) 
The new democratic South Africa did not mean much of an economic fortune to its 
neighbors. Its reincorporation in the international market left countries like Lesotho in the 
cold. 
 While the change to democratic government in South Africa has been welcomed by most 
people in what is termed ‘front line’ states , the future relationship between these states 
and South Africa is likely to remain problematic….Lesotho in particular , may well be in 
process of  transition from ‘dependent development to ‘dependent underdevelopment.  82 
 
The new South Africa did not only change direction of capital flow but became a 
common centre for international aid as well. As Roy Love argued, donors considered 
a rollback of financial support from the former (as they were dubbed) front line states 
and focused to more politically strategic beneficiaries83. This meant that, UNDP, 
IDA, Canada, Denmark and Sweden had to cutback their budget towards countries 
like Lesotho in favor of South Africa84.  
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In Lesotho, the smaller size population translated into inadequate institutional 
capacity in both public and private sectors85. The state institutions and private sectors 
are comparatively small and this affected their capacity and competitiveness. In the 
same view, UNDP attributed its budgetary contractions to the limited implementation 
that characterizes the entire Lesotho system.86  USAID and US Information centre 
downsized their programs and relocated their offices and   staff to South Africa on the 
same grounds. 
 
“…the conviction that Lesotho is neither a place of ‘work’ (i.e. of money making) nor a 
centre of ‘progress’ (industry, modernity) - although it is controversial whether the none 
development syndrome is more clearly a product of Lesotho being so much less 
industrialized…”87 The pessimism, scanty patriotism and a strong desire (of some of the 
Basotho people) that Lesotho be integrated into South Africa were rooted only in 
economic grounds.  Coming from way deep with industrialization and FDI attraction is 
critical for the regeneration of patriotism and partnership fortitude. 
 
Therefore, with its benefits package, i.e. ability to create employment, skills transfer, 
capital formation, entrepreneurial skills, technological transfer and efficient managerial 
techniques FDI rekindles hope for the many Basotho people to whom development was a 
distant mirage owing to the resource gap evident in Lesotho. Furthermore, FDI has 
potential of resuscitating Lesotho state legitimacy, restore advantages of sovereignty and 
eliminate claims of it being susceptible to incorporation into South Africa.  
 
More importantly to achieve its vision 2020 that presupposes a better life for all in 2020. 
By the year 2020, Lesotho is seen as stable, democratic, an integrated and unified state 
that will have a strong and a time-honored human capital. Its economy is visualized as a 
strong one and environment will be well managed. The technology will be highly 
developed. To actualize the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) which is a generic 
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policy that accommodates any project and program that is aimed at attacking national 
poverty network and finally to achieve the MDGs that among other things, includes 
halving excessive poverty by 2015 in developing countries is the core. 
 
The Incentives for FDI in Lesotho besides, the foreign trade, quota preferences accords 
 
The FDI that positions itself in Lesotho enjoys the gains of large Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU) market, a versatile labor force, inexpensive lease rates, and 
unfailing, cheap electricity provisions. These four factors together, build up an 
investment climate that is favorable for business venture. For instance, Lesotho was 
described as one of the countries that have cheaper electricity that is at affordable fee rate 
of US$ 0.037 for every kW/h; comparing it with other cases in the region where 
electricity costs in US$ at 0.076 for each kW/h88. It is further argued that; for a year, a 
lease cost is at US$ 2.05 for a square meter and this is comparatively the cheapest rate in 
the sub-Saharan African region studied89. In other countries in the region, the standard 
cost is US$30.60 for square meter in twelve months.90  For the office working space 
inside most important sites and their environs, the costs rates are also the cheapest at US$ 
11.20 and US$ 8.40 for each square meter correspondingly. Its membership in the SACU 
also affords a convenience to investors since one can easily import through South Africa 
duty free.91 
 
Lesotho market network 
Lesotho apparel industry is one of the largest and most competitive in sub Saharan 
Africa92, exporting to US, Canada, the European Union, Dubai, Qatar, Chile, Japan and 
Taiwan. Lesotho also exports apparel and ring spun yarn to South Africa, denim to 
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Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar and Mauritius. The major feature of textile industry in 
Lesotho is that it is dominated by Taiwan investors. Table 5.0 also exhibits the key 
players of FDI in Lesotho, the market size, number of total firms in Lesotho, principal 
market driver and the number of jobs created for the Basotho people. The table 4.0 refers. 
 
Table 4.0, a profile of the Lesotho textile 
Industry Feature Detail 
Market size $296 million m2  equivalent 
Number of firms  35 
Ownership structure Taiwan 65%, Hong Kong 13%, Lesotho 11%, 
South Africa 5%, Israel 3%, Singapore 3%. 
Principal markets USA 93%, Other 3% 
Production  characteristics Mainly CMT 
Principal market Driver AGOA 
Principal material input sources China, South Korea, Taiwan 
Employment  Estimated local workers: 44,000 
Expatriate staff:1,076 
Source: Global development solutions (2005) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Developmental state theory for FDI, Governance and Development Debates 
 
The previous chapter has set the stage for the main arguments of the paper. It has 
measured the main concepts and has discussed the background within which the focus of 
the study is. In historical perspective it has provided how Lesotho FDI evolved over time 
and has provided more details on how FDI governance and development interact. It has 
discussed both the MFA and AGOA phases in an effort of showing the FDI patterns in 
these eras and has discussed the economic structure of Lesotho. The chapter further 
discussed governance types and their capacities in order to contextualize how the 
governance type and capabilities matter for development acceleration in the developing 
countries and the pitfalls of adoption of exclusive market enhancing (good governance). 
 
The chapter two consists of two sections. The first section discusses the theoretical frame 
work and the second section consists of literature review.  The study adopted 
developmental state theory. This theoretical approach assumes that the state should direct 
investment and use of the accumulated capital in order to accelerate national 
development. This theoretical view illuminates why FDI has a limited impact despite the 
described patterns and potential of FDI which is an issue central to the main question of 
the study. The literature review explains views of different scholars and international 
institutions in relation to the central argument of the study as has been staged in chapter 
one. It is structured in three categories: global view, regional view and Lesotho context 
view. These views provide partly a proof of some of the claims that the study has made in 
the previous chapter and that the study is indeed addressing a substantive argument in 
existing concepts. 
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The developmental state theory as propounded by Baissac has revolted the neoclassical 
approach on economic growth in relation to unsuccessful efforts for economic 
development in developing countries93. It also posited that the fundamental problem 
inhibiting economic development in the developing countries is productivity. This 
theoretical perspective argues to finding a different footing in relation to the chronic 
economic hardships in developing countries as opposed to the orthodox of the neo-
liberals that advocate for uncontrolled exclusive market led economic growth. However it 
does not dislocate the market from the economic functions but undertakes that the state 
should complement the market limitations and flaws94. The developing countries are 
characterized with low productivity which can not be easily redressed neither by 
dependence on natural resources endowments nor FDI comparative advantage95.   
 
When the liberal thinking provides that, foreign direct investment is a path to 
development, the developmental state theory argues that, FDI can lead to development 
but only when the transnational corporations (TNCs) are neutralized by local business 
and recipient government guardianship. FDI in the sub-Saharan African countries needs a 
substantial moderation of governments because market alone does not display enough 
competence in reconstructing the regional economies for a sustained development. 
Countries like Japan and others in the East Asia are reported to owe their excellence in 
economic development to the developmental state approach96.  
 
This theory assumes that, a state should have very powerful political abilities so as to be 
in a position to have an involvement in technological advancement that is vital in 
productivity improvement.  FDI has a potential for a technological transfer only when it 
has come to the host economy in form of Greenfield investment. This means that the 
footloose Brownfield FDI is limited for improving productivity in Lesotho because it 
does not have the sunk costs in production sector.  
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The exclusive market oriented assumption for development in the sub-Saharan African 
countries does not dovetail with the developmental state theory point of view. The 
African leaders have submitted to the exclusive market led economies preferred by IFIs, 
which are cynical about efficiencies of the state involvement for regional economic 
development97. This  approach has compromised development process in the region so 
much that some scholars argue that the leaders of sub- Saharan Africa are not part of the 
solution of development problems in their region but constitute bigger percentage of such 
problems98.  
 
The cases where the state interference led to problems do not justify failure of the state99. 
This means that, an investigative approach of the state capabilities in cases where it failed 
and succeeded would have facilitated for a selective draw of state capabilities. There is 
no hope for a developing country that basks in short term reflected glory of the free trade 
and neoclassical redistributive efficacies of uncontrolled market100. 
 
The productivity benefits don not have their roots in market dealings, but they are a 
product of growth enhancing governance. The governance that has been carefully 
matched with relevant capacities and strategies to effectively organize factors of 
production for better improvement in production and effective distribution of resources to 
the functioning sectors of the economy101.   
 
The developmental state theory deems that investment potential is contingent on the 
capabilities of the host government. In instances of the weak states, the FDI dominates in 
the host country and eventually eclipse the local business while with stronger 
governments it plays a vital role in improving the domestic enterprise technologies.102 
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The syndrome that was cultivated by the pre-colonial politico-cultural predispositions 
supporting clientilist, patrimonial rentier and crony state103  has not only weakened 
governments in Africa but also paralyzed regional development. The position of the 
modern mercantilist school of thought that subscribes to the strong economy and well-
built state aspires to developing strategies for national wealth in a perspective of 
eventually increasing the international competitiveness and development104.  The state in 
developmental state view should have ability to amass resources for the building up of 
well-off people through equitable distribution of wealth105. The state should be able to 
free the people from the unspeakable poverty trap and exploitation by the economic elites 
who normally stand opposed to empowerment and pro-poor policies106. 
 
The developmental state perspective considers that political leaders and technocratic 
chief administrators should have commitment and ability to implement public 
developmental policies for the achievement of accelerated development and distribution 
of resources107.  
 
Literature Review 
 Global view 
According to UNCTAD the net effect of FDI on host countries’ economies is by and 
large remarkable108. The effectiveness and efficiency of service in industries have been 
significant for overall competitiveness of economies; this means that their capacity to 
improve human dignity on a continued basis. In addition the enhanced circumstances for 
the proviso of important consumer services such as: education, health, water and 
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sanitation directly make a payment to betterment of livelihood values as well as human 
resources.  
 
Dunning contented that, the amalgamation of economic development, cultural values and 
dimension, resource and technical competence, organizational effectiveness, political 
principles, worldwide participation and economic proficiency are aspects that factor in 
appraisal of FDI usefulness109. At the same time as it adds value to a country’s productive 
assets, FDI concurrently may tenaciously bog down the country into a prototype of 
economic interdependence which its costs and benefits are merely pronounced 
afterwards. FDI convey a means of life from the investing country to the host economy 
and reinforces the economic array of which in it, there is a fraction of arrangements that 
may not necessarily be beneficial to the host country. The effects of M&A investment are 
poles apart from Greenfield investment; so as those coming up from an Investment by 
well-known and incorporated multi-national enterprises (MNEs) are not similar to a new 
medium sized Investment. 
 
Stieglitz also argued that, lots of the multinationals have not done enough to improve the 
working circumstances in the developing countries. Only gradually have they come to 
realize the potential and experiences that they previously had. Provision of improved 
working conditions may in point of fact augment worker efficiency110. 
 
Moreover, such investments have other unfavorable impact and over and over again do 
not prop up development. The income from the mining concessions can be precious but 
development is transformation of people lives.  FDI sometimes lead to a phenomenon 
dubbed ‘Dutch’ disease. The inflow of the foreign capital results in inexpensive imports 
and costly exports and that have got harmful bearing on development. 
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Nunnenkamp disputed that, the developing economies are not capable of distributing 
resources effectively. This affects FDI potential in poverty reduction as stipulated by the 
neo-classical trade theory111.   The gap between the rich and the poor possibly will rise 
even in situations where FDI does not expand to skillful industrial based transformation. 
Coincidentally, over time, skilled elites of the labor force get a better windfall of FDI 
more than unskilled workers.  
 Regional view of FDI 
Dupasquier submitted that, in recent times FDI has been incorporated by African leaders 
as one of the indispensable aspects of African development. This is after a long 
resistance, and reservations that FDI possibly would weaken political sovereignty, would 
do better than local business and drive it into insolvency. FDI was mainly in natural 
resources sector, it was viewed as the main culprit of ecological degradation which did 
not have economic benefits.112 
 
Johan Dahl endorsed claims that in the SADC region, there association between 
inflowing FDI and of FDI stocks per capita indicates a very frail rapport. The majority of 
SADC countries have a propensity to maintain their economic growth higher than 
population growth in the period of 1990s113. This enabled them to have a good FDI per 
capita besides Angola, Congo-DRC, South Africa and Zambia where FDI stocks per 
capita remained below expectation. In Lesotho Mauritius and Seychelles, the economic 
growth in relation to population growth was good, it has been between three and five 
percent in the period of 1990s. 
 
Again, the growth enhancing ability of FDI is contingent on the chosen form of FDI. It is 
argued that the impact FDI inflow on variables such as technology and physical capital is 
likely to be different between Greenfield and Brownfield (M&A) FDI. The former has 
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capacity to enlarge in the host country (the sunk costs) stock of physical assets that are 
significant particularly in emerging economies that are predisposed to be resource scarce. 
The latter FDI type, transfer over the possession of physical assets of production to the 
foreign investor consequently, gives opportunity to asset stripping.  
 
 
 Lesotho Context 
Lall S. articulated that, FDI has shaped employment and exports for Lesotho, more than a 
few facets offset these benefits. Foreign firms depend a great deal on foreigners. In 2001, 
there were about 1076 expatriates in garments industry mostly originating from Taiwan 
and China. At the higher-ranking and decision-making levels, there were hardly any 
inexperienced Basotho, the only exception being personnel relations. At the production 
level, most administrators were shop floor staff from mainland China who could not 
speak Sesotho and were scarcely capable in English. Their dealings with workers were 
poor and labor relations were exacerbated by noteworthy differences in indigenous 
customs and work ethic, which neither side was skilled to rise above such a bicker114. 
 
Yet again, Lesotho has done very well in attracting FDI and in relation to per capita FDI 
accumulation is well on top of the average for LDCs. FDI flow into export based 
industries accounted for the bulk of most investments which is, in the sub-Saharan 
region, accounts for 90 percent of the overall investment.  
 
Furthermore, Mthente made the following observations and empirical findings about FDI 
in Lesotho: 
 The international ordering process tolerates a small space for backward linkages 
to the Basotho-owned small medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), as 
procurement is directed by business global sourcing tactics. TNCs in Lesotho are 
export oriented and function as ‘full package’ exporters to the USA market. As a 
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result, it is not easy to build up a convincing business case to exhibit to the TNCs 
the prospects these linkages will bring them. 
 
 Despite TNCs not being able to identify enormous benefits from linkages with 
local SMMEs, as well as their concerns regarding corporate management skills, 
capacity and entrepreneurial mind-set amongst domestic small firms almost all 
TNCs with were ready to contribute in pilot linkage program. 
 
 The pilot was contingent on the TNCs representatives’ appreciation of   the 
buildings and grounds of local business in view of assessing possibility of the 
linkage program that focuses on and includes management capabilities, technical 
skills, improving capacity and efficiency. The installing of quality and controls, 
meeting compliance concerns, and investing in premises and machinery become 
integral part of the program as well. 
 
 The foreign direct investors from South Africa are willing to adopt the policies 
that will enable sub-contracting linkages with SMMEs. A number of them has by 
now started CMT operations in Lesotho. Sub-contracting is on the other hand 
conditional on SMMEs’ competence, quality standards control, and consistency 
of which the Lesotho SMMEs go wanting115. 
 
Clean clothes campaign network also reports stated that, most of the people 
interviewed mentioned that, a positive part in all this is that, the employment rate has 
risen, which is a good news in a country like Lesotho with a high levels of 
unemployment. It would be good however to have a look at long term benefits of 
actual investment in Lesotho. Although it is disreputable that trade agreement, 
allegedly proposed to bring benefits to the world least developed countries are in fact 
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resulting few benefits to them and bringing most of the profits to the multinational 
producing companies from all over the world116. 
 
 Besides, the report117 further stipulated that, earnings of clothing workers are not 
adequate as an income for living, and far less than a remuneration required to afford for 
fundamental needs. Earnings are every so often even less than the minimum wage. 
The wages are not enough to cover domestic needs, and support members of the family. 
Some children do not go to school, because the money is not enough to pay for school 
essentials. For them to make end meet they need at least 1000 Maluti to make ends meet 
and this is nearly double what they currently earn. Eight people live off Juliette's salary 
(her parents and five children). She is the sole provider for her family. She can only 
afford for two of her children to attend school. The family lives in one room that is 
divided by a curtain. What Juliette makes is simply not enough to meet her family's 
needs.118 
UNCTAD also pointed out though the FDI performance in Lesotho could not be rated as 
excellent since there were still other adjacent countries that could have been by far, better 
than Lesotho in FDI performance in both size and growth. It was better to describe 
Lesotho’s FDI as commendable considering the fact that it is to head and shoulders above 
many LDCs. For instance, Lesotho attained average annual FDI inflows of US$15 at 
some point in 1996-2000 in contrast with US$6 for other LDCs, for the sake of 
comparison. 
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Chapter three  
Data Analysis  
The main aim of this chapter is to test empirically the assertions that have been made in 
the previous chapters in relation to Lesotho’s performance in attraction of inward FDI 
comparatively to its counterparts. This chapter partly tests the hypothesis that FDI 
performance does not synchronize with development process in Lesotho.    
 
 
This chapter uses the scatter plot technique for explaining trends in FDI inflow in 
different eras of MFA and AGOA. The chapter first of all divulge into the empirical 
world by analyzing trends of FDI inflow over the period of fifteen years. It explains the 
events that contributed into both the spurt and slumps of Lesotho’s FDI. It further 
analyses the trend of GDP per capita and similarly explains series of events that account 
for such patterns in Lesotho GDP per capita. 
 
 Secondly, it compares Lesotho with its counterparts in the sub-Saharan African region. 
Only forty-three countries from this region have been considered for the purpose of the 
paper however countries that have been extensively included in the comparison analysis 
include Mozambique, Botswana and Liberia because of a limited space and time. For the 
intentions of the paper, a bivariate scatter plot of FDI and GDP per capita does not only 
test association between the two variables per se but also assist in comparison analysis for 
seeing how Lesotho country performs in one variable and the other in comparison with   
other countries in the region. In the scatter plot only Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana 
and Equatorial Guinea have been labeled owing to space constraints. Other countries 
have been labeled and appear as dots. 
 
The univarite scatter plot of HDI, further displays the levels of human development 
indices of those countries that have equal footing in World Bank standard for income 
classification of countries. This chapter therefore, reveals that, Lesotho indeed is more 
successful than other countries regarding FDI inflow but however exposes some 
diminishing returns. This is in line with arguments made in earlier chapters that 
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developing countries have distributional inefficiencies. These inefficiencies have been 
attributed to the governance type in the previous chapters. 
 
Analysis of FDI trend for Lesotho 
Though the Lome` convention was already favoring investors based in Lesotho, low level 
of FDI in 1990 was apparently declining in 1991-1992 in figure 2.0. The contraction of 
FDI around this period was due to a series of events: The riots of May 1991 that claimed 
38 lives and caused a destruction that was approximated at £400 million acted as a major 
deterrent for FDI inflow into Lesotho. During the same time, there was a political unrest, 
authoritarianism and government weak administrative capacity119. 
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1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
year
fo
re
ig
n
 
di
re
ct
 
in
ve
st
m
e
n
ts
 
                                                     (Source: World Bank)  
All these factors, together with the then industrial policy that was highly controversial 
might have contributed in the dropping of FDI inflow. However, 1990 to 1992 events 
took place in the eve of popular democracy in Lesotho. 
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In 1993 and afterwards saw better stocks of FDI. As those who are proponents of popular 
democracy argue that, investors prefer democratic regimes as they tend to give more 
assurance of property rights, they are more committed to provision of stability and are 
more credible; in Lesotho there was a political shift of political transformation to 
democracy in 1993 and that boosted the FDI inflow. Furthermore, 2000 show the success 
of the MFA between Lesotho and USA and the dynamic AGOA in stimulating foreign 
direct investment in Lesotho. 
 
However, a steep fall of FDI in 1998 was brought on by the political tensions and 
upheaval that eventually torched businesses and looting of goods. This was a massive 
loss and tragedy for foreign investors as this caused them either permanent relocation 
from Lesotho or an extensive reconstruction of such businesses. The downwards dive 
around 2003 to 2004, in part was due to the MFA expiration which was due to happen 
31st December 2004.  The implications of the termination of MFA amongst other things 
included a sharp downturn in exports and as a result low foreign exchange earnings. It 
also meant that Lesotho was due to face stiff competition from other inexpensive 
manufacturers such as China, Pakistan and India120. Therefore, since some other investors 
were coming from China, there was no need anymore for them to produce from Lesotho. 
Since the exports to USA market are at fixed rate for a certain time, i.e. if Wal-Mart and 
K-mart in USA have gone into business agreement. For instance if   1tonne of Jeans costs 
$5000.00 in that business year, that agreed amount  will not change no matter what 
happens in the international market, the price remains fixed. Even if the one of the two 
currencies involved (Dollar and Rand/Maluti) looses or appreciates value, the price 
remains will not inelastic to the currency changes.  
 
So in Lesotho’s case, if the Rand looses value against the Dollar that means Investors 
exporting to US market from Lesotho will have more of their earnings. The FDI inflow 
into Lesotho will also rise, but in the event that the Rand appreciates value against the US 
dollar, the scenario creates a vice versa situation to Investors. Therefore, fluctuations of 
US dollar and value appreciation of South African Rand have contributed to the 
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downward leap of FDI in Lesotho. Around 2005 and 2006 the South African Rand was at 
its optimum strength against US dollar. The finding regarding this FDI trend is also 
conforming to the report by SADC. “A small drop in exports in 2003 is due to the MFA 
coming to an end on 31 December 2004 which have reduced Lesotho preferences in the 
US market and resulted in drop in clothing exports.” 121  Again Lesotho budget speech for 
the period 2007/2008 explained reasons that caused a down turn in 2005. “FDI stalled in 
2005 as a result of a strong competition from Asia and appreciation of Rand/Loti, jobs 
fell from 55,000 to about 35,000 before recovering towards the end of the year”.122 
 
 
 Analysis of economic trend for Lesotho 
The GDP per capita in Lesotho has been going through ups and downs. In the 1990s the 
growth was at the rate of 6% per annum though it staggered to 3% on average before it 
could pitch 7% in 2007. It has been inconsistent for number of reasons: the growing 
shocks that incorporate considerable real exchange of the Rand to which the Loti is 
attached, dropping of the remittances from South Africa and the swinging trade terms.123 
 
However, the Lesotho export led growth was afflicted with the dynamics of inequalities. 
It is still not convincing as to whether the cumulative GDP per capita that showed an 
increase on annual basis, is a true reflection of what is happening on the ground at the 
grassroots level. Prior studies show that, resources in Lesotho are benefiting the few rich 
people who form a small fraction of the total population of 1, 8 million. 124 
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The GDP per capita trend shows an increase over time although the observation reveals a 
real fluctuation in 1998. The finding is very consistent with the report by Nomahlabi 
Shezi. This report stated that, the political instability negatively impacted on economic 
growth. However in 2002 the positive growth begun to be visible because of growth 
recovery happened as a result of textile industry that around the time formed bigger part 
of FDI in Lesotho125. The LHWP royalties and SACU transfers also have played a major 
role for growth recovery. This graph for GDP per capita implies that, the economic 
growth was positively impacting on lives of the Basotho people over time. It is however 
important to highlight that the trend is inconsistent with Lesotho Gini coefficient of 
2002/2003.126 The Gini coefficient which was at 0.52 in 2002 confirms that, the 
inequality between the rich and the poor was still high. Again the country specific study 
made by UNCTAD in 2004 in Lesotho on investment policy also confirms that DGP per 
capita in Lesotho was impacted negatively in 1998127. The growth patterns as seen on 
figure 2.1 gives a wrong impression because the SACU transfers and LHWP royalties 
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that (technically) by definition do not form part of FDI  have directly  influenced on the 
GDP per capita yet they are beyond the scope of the study owing to the  model 
constraints. 
 
Lesotho FDI and per Capita GDP in comparison with other countries in the sub-Saharan 
Countries 
The scarcity of information with regard to trading partners, investment prospects and 
scanty inducements to attract FDI inflows contributed to the meager investment inflows 
into Africa.128 Nonetheless, inspired by the preferential market access through AGOA, 
Lesotho is one of the few countries that have been successful in attracting FDI to their 
own economies in large stocks.  
 
Figure 2.2 scatter plots the sub-Saharan African countries and this will give an indication 
as to how they rank comparatively. This scatter-plot confirms claims that Lesotho has 
been doing well comparatively in the context of FDI attraction after Equatorial Guinea 
and Liberia.  The former (Equatorial Guinea) is oil led economy and the latter (Liberia) 
has some traces of oil and gold but mostly is endowed with timber respectively. The rest 
of the countries have clustered together, including Botswana and Mozambique, showing 
no much deviation from each other in terms of FDI inflow.  
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0 10 20 30
-
5
0
5
10
15
20
FDI and GDP Per Capita Growth
FDI % of GDP
GD
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
%
 
gr
o
w
th
LSO
MOZBWA
LBR
GNQ
  
Though Lesotho seems to hover above its neighboring countries in the region regarding 
inward FDI, its international trade policy is indexed on SACU trade policy. However, the 
levels of FDI attest to Lesotho’s commitment in participating in the international trade 
and taking full advantage of the preferential market access both in European Union and 
United States. Figure 2.2 is in conformity with   claims made earlier by some researchers 
and international organizations. MIGA described Lesotho in similar terms as Lall, World 
Bank and LNDC: “Lesotho is the Africa’s leading exporter of apparel to the US.” 129 
 
GDP per capita in the sub-Saharan African countries 
As we have seen elsewhere (in table 2.0) the extent to which investment matters for some 
economies in the sub-Saharan Africa (especially Lesotho) and have also seen in figure 
3.2 that Lesotho inward FDI level has located it as one of the best after Equatorial Guinea 
and Liberia in relation to inward FDI. Being the African leading exporter of apparel to 
US has acted as a springboard for Lesotho’s description as being one of the best countries 
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in FDI inflow. 130   In contrast, figure 2.2 reveals that in relation to GDP per capita, 
Lesotho comparatively shows a sluggish progress. This finding is consistent with what 
IMF table 3.0 has unveiled: growth is not synchronizing with FDI performance in the 
situation Lesotho. This table (3.0) further indicated that countries like Mozambique, 
Swaziland and Mauritius have a better real GDP growth and figure 2.2 confirms that 
Lesotho slacks in economic performance relatively to other countries in the sub-Saharan 
region.  Figure 2.2 also in general shows that sub-Saharan countries are at almost the 
same lower levels in GDP per capita with few exceptions. Lesotho is amongst the 
countries that have low per capita GDP although that is a cross cutting characteristics 
with the exception of the few countries such Mozambique, Botswana and Mauritius that 
seem to be performing well economically.   
 
The disparities and variations amongst the sub-Saharan African countries in per capita 
GDP represent a substantial divergence in development levels in the member countries, 
as we have seen in table 2.0 that the whole regional growth rate was at 3.2 percent. 
Currently, the literature points to growth rate of 6.5% in the region in 2007 to 2008 but 
with a yawning economic gap between the oil exporters and oil importing countries. 
Hence Equatorial Guinea remains as an outlier. 131  
 
 
Lesotho HDI in juxtaposition with selected sub-Saharan African Countries 
Lesotho human development index in the following scatter plot dipped and in figure 2.3 
shows its relative HDI position to other sub-Saharan African countries that are also in the 
category of Lower Middle Income in accordance with UNDP categorization. In this 
figure the higher the country the better is its HDI.  
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There seems to be a wide inequality amongst nations of the sub-Saharan Africa region, 
with Lesotho ranking at almost lowest levels of the scatter plot. This reflects the pattern 
of diverging development in the sub-Saran countries. Though these selected countries 
belong in the same category of Lower Middle income, they are however looking different 
in distribution of wealth. Cape Verde and Seychelles (though the latter is not selected 
because it is not in the category of Lower Middle Income) were the only exception when 
the other sub-Saharan countries were classified in the bottom fifty to sixty with regard to 
human development132. The overall picture is that there are significant sectors of 
population which are still under a complete income inequality in the region. 
 
We were amazed to learn that despite so many aid efforts on behalf of programs like, 
Feed the Children and Product (RED) sub-Saharan Africa remains the only region in the 
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world in which human development has declined. The most reason why sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region in decline is because of its weak government133. 
 
The scatter plot enables us to figure out how each country is organized in relation to 
capacitating itself towards preventive and protective medicinal capabilities. Lesotho’s 
Patient Doctor Ratio of 20,000:1134 compared to 2,500:1 in Botswana, 1,300:1 in South 
Africa, 8,300:1 in Zambia speaks volumes on how poor distribution of resources is and 
why life expectancy has gone down to barely 34.4 years135. The Patient Doctor ratio 
conforms to the finding made by Deborah Wason and David Hall who argued that “the 
20000:1 ratio, is double that for SADC region and health sector share of government 
resources steadily declined during the last five years of the last century” 136. 
 
Though Lesotho has high literacy rate and enrolment, it unfortunately has high drop out 
rate that offset the benefit of high literacy and enrolment. The young children quit school 
at the early stage without capabilities and skills that can sustain their quality of lives. 
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Chapter four 
 
The Bilateral Commission for Cooperation between Lesotho    and 
South Africa (JBCC) 
The previous chapter was tested how both the independent (FDI) and dependent 
(development) variables relate to each other.  The comparative analysis has unveiled that 
the performance of the two variables, in the case of Lesotho, does not corroborate with 
neo-classical view that FDI inflow lead to accelerated economic development. This 
chapter verifies the assertions that have been made in view that, some international NGOs 
left Lesotho because of low implementation capacity137. This chapter will give evidence 
that the exclusive good governance is characterized with low capacity in implementation 
of economic policy and as a result does not boost development process, no matter how 
much of the resources are pumped in a certain country.   
 
To assess this governance capability for implementation of economic policy the chapter 
adopts a comparative analysis of the bilateral commissions between Lesotho and South 
Africa (JBCC) and Mozambique and South Africa (JPCC).  
 
 The two Countries signed a bilateral commission in 19th April 2001. This was during the 
official visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho by President Mbeki.  The agreement committed 
the two countries to a strategic partnership and the key objective was to assist Lesotho to 
graduate from the stage of the least developing countries (LDCs) to a developing country 
status within the period of five years.  
 
 
 Pavlic B. and others argue that, many developing countries are engaged in number of 
integration and cooperation. However these cooperation initiatives differ in scale due to a 
myriad of reasons; (a) number of countries that are involved, (b) objectives of integration 
process, (c) focus and strength of amalgamation, (d) technical approach of cooperation 
i.e. either synchronization of trade and industrial policy or market oriented approach and 
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lastly, the competences to actualize the achievement of the projected objectives that are 
approved. Some countries’ integration may kick-start with great vision but accomplishes 
only a few of their objectives or at times completely fails. Some begin steadily and 
slowly achieve their goals. However, others start with very narrow vision but increasingly 
achieve to the booming end. 138  
 
The regional economic cooperation in the SADC region is based on the two primary 
fundamentals. First, the need to improve cooperation amongst states, secondly, enhanced 
trade and investment flows between countries at different levels of development will 
foster quick regional development through accelerated industrialization processes.139 
 
However, the period between 2001 and 2005 did not bring much of success. There were 
no deliverables of projected goals hence a task team was established in 2004 with the 
mandate of monitoring and guiding the accelerated implementation of the JBCC.  
 
 Despite the efforts committed for implementation of JBCC, there were underlying 
factors that undermined progress. For instance, some misunderstandings that were related 
to the nature of the strategic partnership as to whether the commission was a donor 
/recipient or mutually beneficial partnership bogged down progress. The insufficient rule 
based on public private interface, administrative barriers, business environment regarded 
as restrictive and lack of projected Work Plans to guide the attainment of JBCC 
objectives. There was no research community specialized unit for interdisciplinary areas 
for the attraction of the critical mass of human and financial resources.  
 
 One of the objectives was to strategically assign officials with facilitative role to oversee 
continuity and implementation; monitoring and guiding of activities; report to 
government Principal Secretaries on progress and to ensure that the JBCC was 
compatible with the national  vision of Lesotho and PRSP documents focusing on: 
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employment creation, food security and infrastructure, deepening democracy and good 
governance, Safety and security, access to health services, increasing human resource 
capacity, managing and conserving the environment and improve public service delivery. 
 
The two countries further agreed on proposal to accelerate JBCC process. A document 
called “Accelerated Implementation Strategy for JBCC” was adopted.  The document 
puts emphasis on bank-ability of projects. This means that projects had to be 
economically and financially sustainable in order to qualify for assistance. The document 
also set out different types of projects, ranging from purely government funded, and PPP 
and purely privately funded projects. 
 
In 2005, the two countries assessed the adequacy of the implementation strategies 
contained in the document, as well as the extent to which projects presented by Lesotho 
were within the scope of the major objective of assisting Lesotho to graduate from the 
category of LDCs. Crucial gaps were identified and analyzed, and it was agreed that 
identified projects must be aligned to the graduation criteria.  
 
JBCC attested to a mutual political commitment of the two states to cooperate with each 
other, to even further deepen the relations. For the easy achievement of this purpose 
clusters were instituted: 
 
A) Foreign Affairs Cluster 
 The main focus of this cluster was to organize the official visit of the Prime Mister 
of Lesotho to South Africa on the 19 June 2007. The cluster also mandated to 
oversee that under the JBCC all avenues are explored to ensure that Lesotho benefits 
economically from the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
 
B) Stability and Security  Cluster 
The Justice sector commissioned a cluster to work on Bilateral Agreement on 
Reciprocal (civil orders) Service of process between the two Countries. It was further 
tasked to ensure that the two Countries continue to work together on the program of 
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capacity -building that had already started at the Justice College in the Republic. 
Furthermore the Justice sector was assigned to facilitate reciprocity of Legal Counsel 
and implementation of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in both Countries. Progress 
report was to be reported during the official visit of Lesotho Prime Minister in June 
2007. Under this cluster, there were two sub-clusters. 
i) Police  
This was aimed at prevention of cross-border crime, repatriation of stolen livestock 
and cars were deemed important for both countries. Currently there is a problem in 
relation to the repatriation of stolen cars.  
ii) Defense 
Areas of cooperation in this sector include Training of Lesotho Defense    Force 
(LDF) students in South Africa, Registration of LDF Military Health Personnel with 
the SA Health Profession Council, refurbishment of Lesotho military vehicles, 
Referrals of LDF patients to SA military hospital and Development of the Oxbow 
Military Base in Lesotho. Progress had to be presented at the end of May 2007. 
 
Economic Cluster 
Trade and Industry cluster prioritizes spatial development initiatives (SDIs).                                                                                                                      
Both parties have agreed to take one of the SDIs to Tele in Lesotho. The plan to launch 
the Maluti Drakensberg Route and Maluti Drakensberg experience by publishing the 
book ‘Indanba’ during the tourism promotion in Durban is in progress. The main 
objectives of the launch are to market and profile the MDPT as a major tourist destination 
and to extend the existing Maloti Route to include Kwa-Zulu Natal Province. The 
establishment of the Route is intended to create a center of attention of tourists to the area 
of mutual benefit for the two states. This is part of the broader tourism development 
strategy that identifies major tourist development nodes with the aim of attracting 
investment in tourist facilities, particularly in Lesotho. 
 
The Sani Pass Border Project, 
The relocation of the Sani-Pass Border Post, upgrading of the road from Himveille on the 
South African side through the border post to Mokhotlong on the Lesotho side were 
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identified as important projects within the MDTP. The South African Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), through its Social Responsibility Program 
has provided R52million for relocation of Border Post While South African Department 
of Transport allocated R85million for upgrading of the Road from Himeille to Sani Top 
on the South African side of the Border Post.  
 
Commencement of construction for upgrading of the road from Sani Top to Mokhotlong 
on the Lesotho side is dependent upon a positive consideration of funding request by 
Lesotho Government (through Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture) African 
Renaissance Fund is anticipated to have consideration on this matter. 
 
 
Hydrological Project 
In 2003, the African Renaissance Fund allocated R5, 301,660 for a project. This helped to 
improve hydrological flow measuring stations in Lesotho. Sixteen stations have been 
already installed for 1; 7million.The project has been delayed by waiting for the awarding 
of a new contract for the procurement of hydrological equipment by South Africa. 
 
Metolong Dam project and Lowlands Water Supply Project 
The Metolong has been added to the list of projects as a special vehicle to show pratical 
progress with the JBCC. The USD 120.74 million Metolong dam is to be constructed in 
the South of the Phuthiatsana River near the village of Ha-Seeiso. The dam will supply 
water for domestic, commercial and industrial purposes. 
 
Geo-chemical Mapping Project 
The main purpose of this project is to create a geological infrastructure and to stimulate 
prospecting and exploration. The compilation of geochemical maps will eventually be 
made. The Council for Geosciences (GSC) in South Africa has agreed to analyze the 
stream sediment samples. 
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Road Corridors 
The road corridors that connect Lesotho with South Africa through the various provinces 
are yet to be completed. At Qachas Nek –Matatiele corridor, the Lesotho side completed 
upgrading of the road. South Africa is yet to start. At Tele-Herschel corridor South Africa 
is done with road upgrading while Lesotho is not started with Road Works. On the 
Makhaleng –Zastron corridor Lesotho is done with the Road upgrading and South Africa 
has not commenced yet. 
The Lesotho Rail Link 
 
Under the umbrella of Rail Link Inter-Country Committee, a desk top feasibility study 
was done by the engineers from Spoornet and Ministry of Transport and Public Works. 
The project was sold to SADC and NEPAD and the latter adopted it. 
 
Maseru Container Terminal 
The Maseru container terminal is one of the most important interfaces between the two 
states as far as trade and investment are concerned. Moshoeshoe1 International Airport 
(MIA) was also regarded as important for trade facilitation and regional integration. It 
holds great potential for regional economic growth and on this note, it has been envisaged 
that MIA be upgraded for accommodating Cargo and large aircrafts.  
 
Mozambique and South Africa also have Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation 
(JPCC) of the same scale with that of Lesotho and South Africa. This forms a benchmark 
against which we can gauge the how far successful the JBCC implementation vis-à-vis 
JPCC. The comparison of the two Commissions provides a clear basis of the position that 
there has been a limited implementation regarding Lesotho and South Africa JBCC. 
South Africa and Mozambique economic cooperation described as the strongest in the 
SADC region. Perhaps Lesotho and South Africa’s JBCC can better be described as the 
weakest in the region. 
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South Africa and Mozambique JPCC 
 
Background 
The JPCC between South Africa and Mozambique was endorsed by the two states 
involved140. Since then to 2005, South Africa and Mozambique had entered into 26 
Agreements Protocols as well as memorandum of understandings (MoUs)141. “The close 
bilateral relations between South Africa and Mozambique are characterized by constant 
high level of interaction on presidential, ministerial, director-generals, officials as well as 
at parliamentary level, in all the spheres of cooperation”.142 
 
 
These relations have played a major role in promoting trade, investment, tourism, and 
security between these two states. South Africa has become a major spring for 
Mozambique FDI143.Alpha Omar reported that, the Mozambique investment promotion 
centre has  indicated that South Africa has scaled up the stocks of FDI into Mozambique 
in 2005, thus cementing itself  as the  main foreign investor in that country144. The total 
exports by South Africa to Mozambique are valued at R6, 402,557 billion since the 
period1994 to 2005and South Africa imported from Mozambique goods to the value of 
R199, 292 million in the same period145.   
 
The trade between the two states has swelled by more than 600%146. The 40% of the total 
Mozambique imports come from South Africa and companies from South Africa that 
have invested in Mozambique play an important role in shaping pattern of exports from 
Mozambique to South Africa. South African imports from Mozambique have also been 
significantly augmented147.  
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Development Projects 
The industrial development corporation has been adopted by South Africa as a basic spur 
for investment in Mozambique. The industrial development supports numerous 
development projects in Mozambique mainly in infrastructure and in investment in 
mining and mineral beneficiation.148  
 
Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
The South African Natural Gas Pipeline project successfully started. The pipeline that 
transports gas from Mozambique to South Africa fills a gap of 120 gj that South Africa 
needs for production of electricity. The Mozambique government has a control on 1mn gj 
of natural gas per annum.  Sasol, a synthetic producing company from South Africa has 
now invested some $ 1, 2 billion in Mozambique149. 
 
Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park 
Important advancements have been made on the other development schemes   as part of 
the R40 million allotted by South Africa for implementation of other projects on Great 
Limpopo Trans-frontier Park on the South African part. South Africa has the transferred 
animals from the Kruger national park to the Wildlife Sanctuary in the Limpopo National 
Park150.  
 
Mozambique investment in South Africa 
Mozambique also has some investments in South Africa, such include the private 
companies such as; the Portuguese conglomerate, Sonae, bought Sappi-Novo board  in 
2004 and the Mpulanga Investment Initiative that gives an optimism of enlargement of  
investment in that province. A huge Portuguese exporter of cork is also available at 
Montague Park; Amorim Cork South Africa PTY.151 
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The nation owned Bank of Mozambique operates in South Africa. BANCO PRIVADO is 
not a state Bank but is a private owned Mozambique Bank operating from South Africa 
as well and has got a branch in Johannesburg. BANIF Bank also commands some 
investments in South Africa and has a branch in Bruma. 152 
 
There is also Portuguese Cement Company that also competes in South African 
marketplace with its counterpart Natal Portland Cement Company and has got the 
factories: in Simuma, Durban and New Castle. Its production capacity ranges in 1million/ 
ton per annum and commands 11% of the total market. Pestana chain is one of the good 
Portuguese hotel chains that run a hotel in Melane Kruger Park. 153 
 
The other important investments from South Africa  in Mozambique are: US$ 50 million 
investment by SAB Miller in beer factories in Maputo and Beira, US$ 63 million by 
Illovo  Sugar in Maragra sugar mill, Xinavane US$ 22million and US$ 15, 5 million 
investments by McCormack to build Matola Plaza.154 
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Chapter five 
Observations and Discussions of the evidence 
The evidence illustrates that Lesotho has been very effective in terms of exploiting trade 
privileges as afforded under MFA and AGOA respectively. It has been able to use both 
MFA and AGOA to its advantage successfully for inward FDI enlargement. It is however 
important to notice that Lesotho used MFA effectively only at its late stages towards its 
expiration and this was due to its economic policy that was vulnerable in post colonial 
regime period. Wellings explains that, during the MFA early stages Lesotho had adopted 
a policy reflective of its economic vulnerability towards South Africa: “…a tacit 
agreement had existed between the two countries whereby Lesotho had promised not to 
develop competitors to the established South African concerns” 155 and that “The possible 
transformation of Lesotho from labor reserve to export platform was a scenario to be 
resisted by Pretoria and South African Capital”156. Given these circumstances, it is 
comprehensible why Lesotho could not exploit its niche in the international market and 
its venture into industrial arena was curbed at its initial stage. 
 
Though figure 3.2 shows that in the region there is a meaningful FDI inflow on average, 
Lesotho seemed to have performed better than other major apparel exporters to US 
market under AGOA such as, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Swaziland. Our point of departure with Han Joon Chang has been that FDI is a capital 
formation; it improves both physical and human capital accumulation157.  It veritably, 
provides governments with revenue through corporate tax, and as result swells the 
national cake. 
 
It is nonetheless observed that the economic growth of Lesotho is much dependent on 
factor accumulation (Physical capital and human capital) as the IMF158 has statistically 
indicated that factor accumulation constitutes 105% of real growth in Lesotho.  The low 
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productivity that table 2.0 displayed confirms that Lesotho’s economic development is 
not depended on factors within the country but on factors that the country does not have 
control over. For instance, if the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis in the US pitches 
extremes and the consumers’ confidence gets dented with looming liquidity trap, they 
will start hoarding the money. This will affect the selling rates and returns of the world 
giant market (Wal-Mart) and in that regard it (Wal-Mart) will roll back its purchasing 
capacity. This will have implications to exports from countries such as Lesotho and 
instantly FDI will decline and as result the capital accumulation will slow down.  Other 
countries in the region that are not dependent on factor accumulation of capital flow 
which is backed up by the apparel footloose FDI will not bear the brunt of the situation in 
the same way as Lesotho. 
 
The scenario that is unveiled by figure 2.2 show  that a role that inward FDI play to 
accelerate  development hinges on other factors that when not properly placed,  even with 
so much inward FDI stocks, it will not be easy to have a proportional levels of 
development to the level of FDI inflows.  
 
The many factors that affect efficiency of an economy involve public goods element, and 
it is well known that in economics market themselves can not provide enough amount of 
public goods. Usually governments are the only agents that have an ability to provide 
public goods, which implies that the role of government is important in economic 
growth159. 
 
Lesotho development process seems to be going at a stalling pace. The figure 3.5 
illustrates that, HDI for Lesotho is at a lower position relative to its peers from sub-
Saharan Africa that also are in the same category of lower middle income with Lesotho in 
UNDP standards. There seems to be some diminishing returns towards human capital 
development.  This scenario resonates with the argument that the exclusive market 
oriented governance is capable of efficiently allocating resources. It was also argued 
earlier that, market oriented governance fails especially in developing countries where 
                                                 
159
 awww.adbi.org/discussion- 
paper/2006/11/28/2066.fdi.southasia.policy.trends/impact.and.determinants.of.fdi/ accessed on this 
date:04/July/2008 
                                                                               63 
exclusive market oriented governance entrusted in resources allocations towards other 
productive sectors of economy. However still, the situation depends on appropriateness 
and congruence of the strategies and policies geared towards effecting progress. For 
instance, Khan argues that growth enhancing governance owes its success on certain 
institutional and political aspects that provide a favorable environment for enforcement of 
development strategies, and in any event if essential governance capabilities are not in 
place growth enhancing strategy may be counterproductive160. This means, (even though 
the issue of sequencing is critical for development in the developing countries) that some 
countries have adopted certain strategies that allow them to have efficient resource 
allocation to the productive human capital, hence the differences we observed in human 
development  indices in the  selected sample of the lower middle income category in the 
sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Sachs and others in their work that reviewed poverty in Africa attributed development 
problems in the region to the structural barriers that among other things included low 
productivity161 which else where Khan has associated it (low productivity) with market 
oriented governance. Table 3.0 also demonstrates levels of productivity in some of the 
sub-Saharan countries and Lesotho is one of the countries with low (less than zero) 
productivity levels. This becomes consistent with Khan’s argument that good governance 
is not a silver bullet that can solve development problems of the developing countries 
without it being inclusive of growth enhancing governance162.  
 
Table 2.0 shows the regional performance with regard to good governance. The regional 
ranking of sub-Saharan countries reveals how hard to achieve good governance 
conditions under poor chronic poverty that the member countries are still mired in. With 
regulatory quality that measures the ability of government to competence in supporting 
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private sector Lesotho only rates at 24.8%163. Sachs and Khan in the independently of 
each other have a consistent argument that  poorer countries steadily have poorer good 
governance indices compared to richer countries since good governance itself needs huge 
resources in order to finance institutional change that have to conform to the western 
standards164. It is almost impossible to accomplish the good governance prerequisites in 
developing countries. 165 
 
However, the developing countries from the sub-Saharan region almost invariably are 
subjected to the conditionalties that seem to be backing up (if not a replica of) good 
governance model which evidence has indicated that it is not capable on its own to 
accelerate development because of its infallibilities. The eligibility conditions under the 
AGOA market arrangement make this argument even clearer.   
 
 On the offensive these days are those who believe that every country should adopt a set 
of ‘good institutions’ (Unfortunately often implicitly equated with US institutions), with 
some minimal transition provisions (five-ten years) for the poor countries-various 
agreements in the WTO being the best example of this. Backing up this claim is a rapidly 
growing body of literature, especially from the World Bank and its associates, which tries 
to establish statistical correlation between institutional variables and economic 
development, with supposed causality running from the former to the latter166.  
 
As a result the focus of governance agenda is not home-grown; it is not set and refined by 
the public debate at home167.  The whole package of conditionalities becomes the order of 
the day. The good governance apparently has been pushed on the developing countries 
and it is very heavy unto them. “Imposing development from outside does not work”168  
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The good governance is an end of many other fundamentals that should have happened 
prior its adoption as the developed countries were only in a position to adopt it at their 
maturity stage of development. Earlier on, Khan argued that, economic development 
should take place prior market enhancing governance then the latter can follow and this 
argument goes hand in glove with Chan’s assertions: “The successful developers are also 
misleading as role models because the pragmatic steps they took were compatible with 
their political conditions and could be easily implemented” 169. This means that 
developing countries are being misdirected to put their focus where it best serves the 
interests of the NDCs; the harmonization with local initiatives and customization of such 
exotic policies is less articulated170.  
 
Lesotho good governance indicators describe Lesotho as one of the most loyal and 
committed countries to the ethos of good governance without having internal controls 
that would ensure that a domestic governance agenda is not completely abandoned. 
Comparatively, Lesotho good governance indicators score rate far ahead the regional 
aggregated scores however, GDP per capita flagged that , economic development 
performance in  Lesotho is lagging behind as compared to its neighbors that in contrast 
lack far behind when it comes to inward FDI to Lesotho. This scenario is in conformity 
with the argument that exclusive good governance is not capable of accelerating 
development especially where it is not blended with compatible strategies that can initiate 
accelerated economic development. 
 
Some critics have indicated that certain international NGOs and organizations deserted 
Lesotho and some even rolled back their budget owing to its limited implementation 
capacity.  This claim that Roy made seems to be supported by evidence unearthed in the 
bilateral commissions. The JBCC between Lesotho and South Africa typifies Lesotho 
governance as one that is plagued with deficiency of capabilities to deal with the moral 
hazard of inefficiency within its institutions. Sachs171 argues that, governments should 
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spearhead coordination and implementation of their development programs and should 
not be limited to the crafting plans only.  
 
However, after the display of political will and thus commitment by the two states’ head 
of government to cooperate in view of spurring Lesotho economic progress JBCC was 
consigned to the technocracy level. The government leaders left the implementation part 
within the purview of the officials and this did not reflect any political pressure and 
urgency on the side of officials. The governments leaders’ spur of sense of urgency was 
only limited to their speeches (especially from the Lesotho side) during the official visits 
to either Lesotho or South Africa. “When we signed the JBCC agreement in 2001, we 
were demonstrating our political will and commitment.... we were very genuine about 
this.”172. Looking at Mozambique and South Africa JPCC, one sees that every meeting, 
either a Minister or the President himself is leading the delegation to either South Africa 
or Mozambique depending on who hosts in that particular time. The high powered 
delegation led from Lesotho by the Prime Minister to Cape Town in July 2007 was the 
first one since 2001 when the South African president was in Lesotho for the first signing 
of JBCC. This means that, in the period 2001 to 2005 implementation all had to be done 
by the officials. In contrast, the bilateral economic cooperation meetings between the 
Mozambique and the Republic were characterized by a constant high level interaction, 
amongst heads of government of the two states, Ministerial as well as parliamentary 
level.  
 
The JPCC deliberates at senior official level on progress made with the implementation 
of the technical component of the various bilateral cooperation initiatives existing 
between the two countries and to report the details of such progress to the Heads of State 
Economic Bilateral Meetings.173   
 
With the Lesotho and South African case, the plethora of meetings took place between 
the government officials alone with very confined latitude of mandate, more so when the 
foreign policy of each of the two countries towards each other is still on transitional 
                                                 
172Pakalitha Mosisili addresses audience, in July 2007, Cape Town. 
173
 http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/port1117.htm, accessed, 17 September 2007  
                                                                               67 
trajectory. There have been some historical ills and injuries that aggravated the relations 
between the countries; though the two democratic governments (ANC led and LCD led) 
are trying to relax their relations the situation is still uncertain and needs a rigorous 
exemplary political leadership to display that Lesotho and South Africa have now 
adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence. In analyzing one of the sources of tension on 
the Lesotho’s foreign policy towards South Africa Hirschman174 submits that:  
 
It had been expected in Maseru that the South African government appreciative of 
Lesotho’s steps to facilitate its outward movement into Africa would provide substantial 
financial aid by way of return. Unlike Malawi which gained capital aid, Lesotho received 
no such favors. 
 
Motlamelle and others argued that the policy between Lesotho and South Africa has not 
changed even under the LCD and ANC led governments the policy of each of the two 
states remains the same towards each other175.  In the mean time, there is a series of 
issues that make Basotho to perceive that South Africa has to contribute a larger share in 
Lesotho’s economic transformation and those have their roots in the history that these 
two countries share. Therefore the inception and ratification of JBCC was ambiguous in 
its nature as to what exactly was meant by President Thabo Mbeki when he made an 
undertaking that South Africa will assist Lesotho to graduate from its position of the least 
developed to the better in period of five years. The statement was made in ACP, UN 
conference at Brussels in 2001. The South African president repeated his words while in 
Lesotho for the signing of JBCC in 2001. All these gave window for diplomatic 
ambiguity in relation to the implementation of JBCC.  
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Diplomatic ambiguity in this case explains the confusion was a result of different 
interpretation each country had about JBCC. One party chose one convenient connotation 
and the other one had also got stuck with the connotation that was best suitable. Each 
party stayed optimistic that it was in the better side of the situation given the background 
that informed its anticipations. In bilateral cooperation of this nature the ambiguity results 
into a misunderstanding that retains the injured party in even more hesitation. Ambiguity 
becomes diplomatic when it is a function of diplomatic contract176. 
 
With regard to JBCC, the Lesotho side pitched its expectations high because they did not 
perceive the cooperation between Lesotho and South Africa to be a relationship of equals 
and as a result anticipated that; South Africa was going to channel millions Rands into 
Lesotho economy to fulfill the political statement that was made by South African 
president. However the South African side perceived the cooperation as a mutually 
beneficial partnership despite the fact that the partners were not of equal size both 
economically and geographically. They completely eliminated the notion of 
donor/recipient arrangement but a mutually beneficial partnership for the two states 
involved.  
 
This confusion could not be semantically fixed quickly. Instead, the officers from the two 
countries involved dedicated all their time from 2001 to 2005 to haggling over for their 
disjointed perspectives. The period 2001 to 2005 did not bring the Basotho people any 
speck of benefit out of the JBCC arrangement in the period 2001 to 2005. The meetings 
were plagued with conflicting perceptions about the perspective of Commission. This 
made the Commission got stuck. The elongated debate on what was right in relation to 
the wording of the contract defeated the purpose of the commission itself for this first 
phase of JBCC. 
 
Again, giving the JPCC of South Africa and Mozambique a glance, we see how the 
Mintek, SAB Miller and many other private and state owned companies are interacting 
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within the context of JPCC to also move in a tempo that is less proportional to the pace of 
the governments.  The Mozambique case attests to governance with abilities of taking 
charge of implementation of appropriate strategies that might well be in alignment with   
their governance agenda. 
 
On the other hand, another problem which became inimical to the effective 
implementation of JBCC was lack of mechanisms that were needed to safeguard and 
promote the industrial sector including the role to be played by each of the stakeholders 
there in.  Lack of industrial approach partly contributed to failure of successful 
implementation of the commission.  The Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC) has 
been utilized by the Government of South Africa as a primary catalyst for South African 
and Mozambique cooperation and development. Trading patterns between the two states 
improved dramatically since the signing of the cooperation. The total exports to 
Mozambique from South Africa were valued at R6, 402 billion. South Africa imported 
from Mozambique to the value of 199, 282 million in the same period, table1 refers. 
                                                       
Libson argues that, the idea of development strategy that excludes private sector is not 
realistic177. The lack of involvement of the small business community is certainly one of 
the factors that also contributed to the sluggish progress of the JBCC implementation. 
“As Your Excellency has kindly arranged, tomorrow I will be interacting with the 
business community with a view to fast tracking promotion of investment in Lesotho by 
South Africans.“178 The role of the business sector in this Commission was only realized 
after six years since the life of the Commission. 
 
Many officials both from the two states did not understand the scope of the Commission, 
they relied on procedure to limit their responsibilities and thus the momentum for 
implementation was totally lost.  This negatively impacted on the scheduled meetings 
that were supposed to have been attended. Apparently Lesotho and South had scheduled 
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to meet four times per annum but this never happened owing to the hazy administrative 
bottlenecks. A paucity of a joint compartmentalized management style, through which 
efficiency in implementation would have been ensured, had been a serious constraint. 
The officials were working under their own command sometimes without even reporting 
to powers that be. There had been a disjuncture between the political executive and the 
government officials to the extent that political executives lost touch of progress of chain 
of events.  
 
What Lesotho did not do? 
Lack of home-grown strategy, failure to realize the importance of interactive role of other 
institutions such as research institution, resulted into a situation whereby Lesotho was not 
able to identify the sound and bankable projects that could have assisted with a quick 
implementation. The absence of a well coordinated research programs and priorities, 
including a significant volume of jointly –programmed public research on investment at 
the bilateral level resulted into lack of knowledge sharing, notably between the public and 
industrial sectors. 
 
The research approach would have helped in surfacing public private chronic and 
pressing problems that needed immediate attention to unchain the growth. It could have 
encouraged the private sector to establish a cohesive consultative analysis mechanism 
and presented a coherent view of its policy needs to the government so that timely 
determination of the entry point of private sector could have been made. Looking at 
South Africa and Mozambique Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation a strong 
cohesion between public and private is evident as illustrated hence “challenges the 
dependence theory doomsday”. 179 
 
 
What South Africa did 
South Africa played a ‘wait and see diplomacy’. Despite the time frame well articulated 
by the President of the Republic, it did not display or commit itself to any sense of 
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urgency in this partnership. South Africa’s role was only facilitative in so far as the 
Commission was concerned. It did not allow itself to assume a leading role. This means 
that, South Africa was only responsive to the Lesotho’s attitude in relation to the pace 
Lesotho was willing to set at to achieve tangible deliverables. 
 
Conclusion 
The study therefore has been comprised of five chapters that have delivered the evidence 
and have vindicated the hypothesis and sufficiently addressed research question through 
the use of scatter plots and comparative analysis. The process tracing was also used in the 
assessment of how variables are connected to each other.  
 
The study intended to explore how FDI, governance and economic development interplay 
in Lesotho. The empirical evidence has provided a confirmation that Lesotho performs 
better than many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However Lesotho lags behind in 
its productivity and economic development performances relatively to many of the 
countries in the region. However all countries in the sub-Saharan Africa that have been 
included  in the study have adopted market enhancing governance (good governance) and 
they only differ in their commitment in acceleration of improving on each governance 
indicator. The difference between Lesotho governance indices and regional governance 
indices demonstrated two issues: (a) Lesotho is more committed than many countries in 
the sub-Saharan Africa in improving on each governance indicator and as a result it 
seems also to be doing better in market enhancing governance (good governance). (b) For 
both independent and moderating variables Lesotho is out performing many countries in 
the sub-Saharan Africa. On the flipside, evidence also shows that development, as has 
been measured in this study, Lesotho is lagging far behind most of these countries. 
 
The diverging scenario between capital accumulation and development makes the issue 
of efficient allocation of resources more central to the argument of the study. The theory 
of developmental state believes that, a state should direct investment in such a manner 
that   it will promote the national economy and should also be adequately be competent to 
establish both political and economic ties that will accelerate development.  The 
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exclusive market enhancing governance (good governance) is limited in relation to 
efficient resources as has been argued earlier in the study.  
 
The relationship of governance type and its capabilities seem to be a culprit in connection 
with the stalling development process due to number of reasons: (i) Good/market 
enhancing governance, as some scholars have argued, it is a burden economically on 
developing countries. It is expensive in the sense that, it changes the local governance 
agenda so that a country can qualify for certain financial assistance from the international 
organizations or/ and the NDCs. The developing countries work so hard, and face a huge 
task of fine-tuning their institutions so that they can take shape of those ones in US. This 
process is financed heavily with the resources that would be otherwise financing the 
development. (ii) The market enhancing governance does not have capabilities competent 
enough to ensure equitable allocation of resources since the market is riddled with 
imperfections. As it was also argued, development entails public goods that good/market 
enhancing governance does not have access to. (iii) Good/market enhancing governance 
seems to be a tall order for the developing countries owing to the fact that, the developed 
countries never adopted it at the early stages of their development. The good/market 
enhancing governance needs a lot of resources and the early stages of development need 
a lot of resource inflows. So the developing states do not have enough resources to juggle 
between the two pressing goals at the same time, as such compromises productivity due 
to its inability to allocate resources. (iv) It is also incapable of enforcing efficiency of 
state institutions such that implementation of the public policy in weaker states remains 
compromised. 
 
Indeed the trends indicated that Lesotho has been able to emerge in FDI attraction over 
and above a reasonable number of countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. However 
evidence shows again that, in contrast Lesotho seems to have some diminishing returns 
towards human capital. This implies certain inefficiency in the distribution of resources. 
The argument above explains why FDI performance is not making much of a difference 
in terms of closing the gap between the rich and the poor. The HDI level for Lesotho in 
2005 reveals this fact. Without discounting the impact of HIV/AIDS, the contention that 
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HDI in Lesotho is affected by HIV/AIDS is not sufficiently supported with evidence. 
First and foremost, HDI is a composite measure of development that accounts for 
longevity of life through life expectancy and as such has catered for the effect of the 
pandemic. Again, Lesotho is not the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that is plagued 
with the disease and there are countries that even have higher prevalence rate of 
HIV/AIDS than Lesotho but their HDI levels are quite higher than that of Lesotho. The 
current statistics unveils that, in 2005 Lesotho prevalence rate was ranging at 28.9% 
while Botswana was at 37.3%, Swaziland was at 38.8% and Kenya was at 6.7%180. 
Looking at HDI scatter plot (figure) we observe that, the argument that Lesotho HDI is 
affected by HIV/AIDS can not hold in absolute terms or is even less supported by 
evidence. Kenya has less HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, in contrast has lower HDI level.  
Botswana has high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and at the same time has a high HDI level 
in the same year. “Resources are allocated less efficiently where anti competitive    
regulations are severe”181.  
 
Crony capitalism syndrome characterizes the nonexistence of competitive service 
regulation because the government gratifies certain class of economic oligarchs at the 
expense of the poorest of the poor. The anti competitive regulations are only consistent 
with the country that has weaker capacities to allocate resources to the active and prolific 
public goods such as the poor people, the disadvantaged groups and women, public 
transport, health and education182. The Lesotho patient doctor ratio of 20, 000:1 
compared to Botswana,  2,500:1, South Africa, 300:1 and Zambia with 8,300:1183 and 
more than 51% 184 of students who drop out  before they reach Form E (metric 
equivalent) provides evidence to the effect that  public goods are not efficiently  allocated 
resources. 
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The low productivity is one of the salient flaws of the market enhancing (good 
governance) and also a daunting problem that Lesotho has.  This also underlines some 
infallibilities of the market enhancing governance (good governance) to allocate 
resources.  “An increase of half a percent a year can make a huge difference over 20 or 
30 years”185 . Higher productivity is figurative of a country’s capability of drawing more 
of goods and services from the factors of production and also signifies higher GDP per 
capita186. So, Lesotho low productivity means failure of the state to coordinate, 
investment, its institutions in a manner that the standards of living of the poor can 
improve. 
 
The heritage foundation reports rates Lesotho’s economy at 51% and has described the 
tax regimes as burdensome.  This means that the government intervention in economic 
affairs is substantially still huge however the public income is used on measures that 
alleviate poverty to a limited extent. In contrast, Basotho people do not seem to be 
gaining proportional benefits as is expected from the public income. “…the control 
regulations are facing great difficulties in developing countries, particularly due to lack of 
appropriate administrative, judicial structures and political will”187. Lesotho is not an 
exception in Africa where the regulations are easily turned around from their initial 
public interest aspirations to favor protection of certain individual groups. 
 
The limited implementation of JBCC during the period of 2001 to 2005 also radiates 
from poor coordination of the public policy implementation in Lesotho which is the result 
of weak organizational structures, poor institutional framework and inadequate skills. 
JBCC is the first cooperation of its own kind that Lesotho ever had in Africa, and it is 
surprising that Lesotho government executives, parliament and other relevant 
stakeholders such as private sector did not occupy the driver’s seat in ensuring the 
expected implementation of the commission. Only middle management officials of a few 
ministries such as Foreign affairs and Development Planning and Finance were entrusted 
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with the responsibility ensuring successful implementation. This approach could have 
demystified the issue of ambiguity at the early stage. A commission of this nature for 
Lesotho befitted both diplomatic and political engagement. The attitude that South Africa 
adopted in relation to this commission speaks volumes about the value it attached on 
JBCC. South Africa has less to loose in failure to accelerate implementation of this 
Commission as the original intent was to lift Lesotho up. Therefore the Lesotho side has 
to pull all possible strings in ensuring accelerated and successful implementation of 
JBCC but all (success or failure) rises and falls on appropriate governance type and 
capabilities. 
 
The significance of findings and implications 
Our findings for this research signify that FDI might have its own benefits and effects but 
its potential to accelerate development is contingent on the governance capabilities to 
regulate and distribute rents efficiently for the faster economic development of the 
country. The FDI potential can not unleash itself unless proper growth enhancing 
strategies are put into place. 
 
Lesotho has a bigger challenge for diversifying its FDI inflow since its economy seems 
dependent on capital accumulation; hence it remains vulnerable to the external shocks 
that are beyond its control. The US sub-prime mortgage loan gives a big alarm for 
diversification need.  Again, the efficient implementation is also another drawback 
against progress in Lesotho but at the same has its roots to the governance abilities and 
type. 
 
The study finally agrees with Khan188 that, even though market enhancing governance 
has some inefficiencies, it does not imply that it is insignificant however the developing 
countries should be given an opportunity to adopt (on incremental basis) only those 
elements that they are relevant in a particular stage of development in their own relative 
political circumstances to complete growth enhancing governance until they have reached 
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maturity stage of development. An implication is made therefore that governance type 
has been a barrier that constrain FDI potential in accelerating development in Lesotho. 
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Appendix 1 
plot(trial$fdi.avg,trial$gdp.avg,type="n", main="FDI and GDP Per Capita 
Growth",xlab="FDI % of GDP",ylab="GDP per capita % growth") 
text(trial$fdi.avg,trial$gdp.avg,labels=trial$ctry) 
plot(trial$fdi.avg,trial$gdp.avg,main="FDI and GDP Per Capita Growth",xlab="FDI % 
of GDP",ylab="GDP per capita % growth") 
text(14,2,labels="Les",col="red") 
arrows(10,10,3.5,3.5) 
text(10,10,labels="Moz",col="red") 
arrows(0,10,1.5,4) 
text(0,10,labels="Bots",col="red") 
text(19.8,-1,labels="LBR",col="red") 
text(37,19,labels="GNQ",col="red") 
 
 
Appendix2 
ssa.data<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
ssa.data 
## 
plot(gdp~fdi,data=ssa.data,type='n', 
xlab='gross domestic product',ylab='foreign direct investment') 
text(ssa.data$gdp,ssa.data$fdi,labels=ssa.data$code,cex=.8) 
## 
reg.out<-lm(gdp~fdi,data=ssa.data) 
abline(reg.out,lwd=2,col='red') 
data<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
data 
plot(data$year,data$fdi,ylab='foreign direct investments',xlab='year',type="b") 
plot(data$year,data$gdp,ylab='gross domestic product',xlab='year',type="b") 
### 
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avg.data<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
avg.data 
plot(avg.gdp~avg.fdi,avg.data,type='n', 
xlab='gross domestic product',ylab='foreign direct investment') 
text(avg.data$avg.gdp,avg.data$fdi,labels=avg.data$code,cex=.8) 
reg.out<-lm(avg.gdp~avg.fdi,data=avg.data) 
abline(reg.out,lwd=2,col='red') 
## 
avg.xl<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
avg.xl 
plot(avg.xl$fdi,data=avg.xl,type='n',ylab='foreign direct investment') 
text(avg.xl$fdi,labels=avg.xl$code,cex=.8) 
reg.out<-lm(avg.xl$fdi,data=avg.xl) 
abline(reg.out,lwd=2,col='red') 
## 
hdi.ssa<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
plot(hdi.ssa$hdi,data=hdi.ssa,type='n',ylab='Human Development Index') 
text(hdi.ssa$hdi,labels=hdi.ssa$code,cex=.8) 
### 
gdp<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
plot(gdp$avg.gdp,data=gdp,type='n',ylab='GDP per Capita') 
text(gdp$avg.gdp,labels=gdp$code,cex=.8) 
### 
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hpi.ssa<-read.delim("clipboard",header=T) 
hpi.ssa 
plot(hpi.ssa$hpi,data=hpi.ssa,type='n',ylab='Human Poverty Index') 
text(hpi.ssa$hpi,labels=hpi.ssa$code,cex=.8) 
Appendix3 
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